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Summary 
On 6 July 2005 the International Olympic Committee chose London as the host city for the 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The Olympics will begin on 27 July 2012, with the 
Paralympics following from 29 August 2012, so the organisations involved in delivering the 
Games have a fixed deadline. Progress has been made in a number of areas since London 
was chosen to host the Games, including on the critical project to re-route underground 
the power lines on the Olympic Park site. The Olympic Delivery Authority has also begun 
its procurement activity, including appointing a Delivery Partner to support in managing 
the delivery of the Olympic venues and infrastructure. 
Two new bodies have been set up. The Olympic Delivery Authority will provide the 
facilities, and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic 
Games (LOCOG) will stage the Games. They are overseen by the Olympic Board, and a 
new team within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (the Government Olympic 
Executive) will co-ordinate the contributions of other parts of government to the Games. 
The Olympic Board will play a leading role in progress monitoring and risk management, 
supported by a Steering Group of senior officials and the Olympic Programme Support 
Unit which provides independent advice to the Board. No one individual has overall 
responsibility for delivering the Games, however, and the large number of bodies involved 
presents significant risks, for example to timely decision-taking. 
At the time of our examination, 20 months after London was awarded the Games, there 
was still no final budget in place, although the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport announced in November 2006 that the cost estimates had increased. A number of 
significant areas of uncertainty remained to be resolved before the budget could be 
finalised—tax, contingency provision, security costs and private sector funding.   
In the event, the Secretary of State announced a revised budget totalling over £9 billion on 
15 March 2007.1 The revised budget increased the total National Lottery funding for the 
Games to £2.2 billion, of which about £1.7 billion is to be diverted from the non-Olympic 
good causes—the arts; sport; heritage; charities and voluntary groups; and health, 
education and environment projects. 
As required by the International Olympic Committee, the Government has underwritten 
the costs of the Games, including any shortfall between LOCOG’s costs and revenues, 
although LOCOG is intended to be self-financing in staging the Games. 
The prospect of the legacy that the Games would bring was central to London’s bid. Plans 
are being developed for the legacy use of the five new venues that will remain after 2012, 
and work is in hand on plans for delivering the wider economic, social, health and 
environmental benefits that the Games are expected to bring. 
 
 
1 Hansard, cols 450–452, 15 March 2007 
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On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General,2 we examined the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Olympic Delivery Authority on the 
progress that has been made in preparing for the Games, and the areas of risk that will need 
to be managed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
2 C&AG’s Report, Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games—Risk assessment and 
management, HC (2006–07) 252 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
We have considered seven main areas of risk, and our specific conclusions and 
recommendations on each are as follows. 
Governance and delivery structures to coordinate the multiplicity of 
organisations and groups involved in the Games 
1. The test of whether the plethora of bodies involved are working effectively will be 
whether individual projects and the programme as a whole progress on time. The 
Department is responsible for providing cross-government coordination, and should 
develop an agreed plan of what needs to be decided, when and by whom. The 
Department should periodically seek the views of the Olympic Delivery Authority 
and LOCOG, the lead organisations delivering the Games, on whether government 
is taking the decisions required at a pace which will allow them to maintain the 
necessary progress.  
2. Continuity of key people on major projects is key to success. The Department, the 
Olympic Delivery Authority and LOCOG should identify which positions are key to 
the successful delivery of the Games, specify the skills requirements for those 
positions, and develop strategies for retaining individuals, knowledge and skills for 
the duration of the Olympic project. 
Delivering the Games against an immovable deadline 
3. Any slippage in the delivery programme would bring the risk of having to pay 
more, or reduce quality, to be ready on time. The immovable deadline could 
weaken the delivery organisations’ negotiating positions on contracts. Any delays 
could mean that additional resources have to be brought in to get projects back on 
schedule, and result in the specifications having to be changed to allow projects to be 
completed on time or to contain costs. The Olympic Delivery Authority will need to 
establish incentive arrangements with their contractors which specifically address the 
enhanced risk of cost overruns and quality shortfalls.  
The requirement for the budget to be clearly determined and effectively 
managed 
4. The costs of the Games were seriously underestimated at the time of the bid and 
the private sector funding seriously overestimated. Subsequent to our hearing, the 
Secretary of State announced a budget for the Games which totalled over £9 billion, 
an increase of some £6 billion on the position at the time of the bid. At the time of 
the bid: 
•  whole categories of cost were omitted, including tax, contingency margin 
and security; 
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•  the Department expected to raise £738 million of private sector funding, 
which would have covered a quarter of Olympic costs, but now there is little 
prospect of significant private sector funding being achieved. 
We intend to return to the budget for the Games on the basis of a further report by 
the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
5. As the ultimate guarantor of funding for the Games the Government is 
financially exposed. In addition to the budget announced by the Secretary of State, 
LOCOG has a budget of £2 billion for staging the Games and is intended to be self-
financing. In seeking to prevent further calls on public money the Department needs 
to satisfy itself that LOCOG’s costs are under control and its revenues on track, and 
should develop a plan for doing so. 
Applying effective procurement practices 
6. The Olympic Delivery Authority has put in place a procurement policy for the £3 
billion worth of goods, services and works it expects to procure for the Games. 
This policy sets out best practice, and any departures deemed necessary to deliver the 
Games should be made clear and explicit at the time. The Department should hold 
LOCOG accountable for developing clear policies in advance of starting its 
procurement programme in earnest in 2009. 
Planning for a lasting legacy 
7. There is a lack of clarity about how venues will be used after the Games, with the 
risk that designs fail to reconcile the needs of the Games in 2012 with those of 
subsequent users. Legacy plans for using the five new venues that will remain after 
2012 should now be finalised, with ownership and responsibility for conversion and 
running costs resolved for each venue. The plans for delivering the wider benefits 
from the Games, which were to have been in place by the end of 2006, should also be 
completed, with the expected outputs and outcomes made clear. 
Effective progress monitoring and risk management arrangements 
8. Strong progress monitoring and risk management arrangements are essential, 
but are not yet in place. For the programme as a whole, incorporating 42 sub-
objectives assigned to 17 lead organisations, the Department should develop a 
framework of timely progress and risk reporting, which ultimately feeds through to 
the Olympic Board and provides early warning of potential difficulties. This 
framework should be supported by arrangements in each individual organisation, 
and work to complete these should be a priority. 
On the impact on the other National Lottery good causes 
9. Funding the Games means that there will be about £1.7 billion less money 
available for the other good causes supported by the National Lottery. As well as 
the £1.1 billion that is to be transferred directly from the other good causes, the new 
designated Olympic lottery games are also having a diversionary effect with an 
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estimated £575 million coming from players who switch from other lottery games. 
The Department should give the Lottery distributing bodies frank assessments of 
when and by how much their income will fall, and they in turn will need to make 
plans setting out how they will minimise the impact on the good causes. 
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1 The need for strong governance and 
delivery structures 
1. There are three principal stakeholders in the Games—the Government (represented by 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport), the Mayor of London and the British 
Olympic Association—and a large number of other bodies are also involved (Figure 1).3 
Figure 1: Summary of the delivery structures for the 2012 Games 
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Source: National Audit Office 
 
3 C&AG’s Report, para 25 
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2. There is a tripartite relationship between the Olympic movement, the Host City (which 
signs the contract with the International Olympic Committee) and the Host Government 
(which has to provide an underwriting guarantee), and the Department stressed that a 
fundamental lesson from previous experience was to get that relationship right. More 
generally the delivery structures had drawn on lessons from previous Games, in particular 
from Sydney which had ended up with the model now put in place for London.4 
3. Two new bodies have been set up to take the lead in delivering the Games. The Olympic 
Delivery Authority will provide the venues and infrastructure, and the London Organising 
Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) will stage the Games 
themselves. It is a requirement of the International Olympic Committee to have an 
Organising Committee, and the creation of the two bodies was a lesson to emerge from the 
experience of the Millennium Dome in terms of the need for different skills at different 
stages of major projects.5 
4. The Department considered that a key achievement of the past year was getting the new 
delivery bodies up and running, with professional management and staff with strong 
capabilities, and that the responsibilities and accountabilities of the two organisations were 
clear. On the question of continuity in key posts in the run up to 2012, the Accounting 
Officers of the Department and the Olympic Delivery Authority confirmed their intention 
to remain in place for the duration of the programme.6 
5. The Olympic Board has been established to bring together the key stakeholders and 
oversee the delivery of the Games. The Board comprises the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport, the Mayor of London, and the Chairs of the British Olympic Association 
and LOCOG. The Chair of the Olympic Delivery Authority also attends Board meetings as 
a non-voting member. No individual has overall responsibility for delivering the Games. 
The Board aims to work by consensus, although the individual members have a right of 
veto over key decisions which affect their particular responsibilities.7 
6. The delivery structures are complex, and the Department acknowledged that, from the 
experience of previous Games, one of the key risks was delay in decision making. It 
considered, however, that the structures were appropriate, with the Olympic Board 
providing strategic oversight and reviewing the Olympic Delivery Authority’s budget. The 
Board had worked effectively, for example in agreeing the draft transport plan. In addition, 
the Olympic Projects Review Group, responsible for ensuring that projects were processed 
speedily and smoothly, had already recommended a number of significant projects for 
approval.8 
7. As for the Department, it oversees both the Olympic Delivery Authority and LOCOG, 
whose Chief Executives are additional Accounting Officers. The Department is also 
responsible for co-ordinating the contributions of other parts of government to the Games, 
 
4 Qq 3, 39, 76, 90 
5 C&AG’s Report, para 27, Figure 3; Qq 84, 94 
6 Qq 76, 92, 166–168 
7 C&AG’s Report, paras 31–33 
8 C&AG’s Report, para 37; Qq 82, 86, 89, 91, 172–173 
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such as the Department for Transport and the Highways Agency who will help to deliver 
the necessary transport improvements in London and elsewhere, for example in Dorset 
where the sailing will be held. A new team within the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, the Government Olympic Executive, had been set up to manage the government’s 
interest in the Games and provide cross-government co-ordination. The capability of the 
Government Olympic Executive to oversee the Olympic programme was to be enhanced 
by the recruitment of a new Director General and Financial Director with commercial 
experience of major projects.9 
 
9 C&AG’s Report, para 34; Qq 86, 105, 152–153 
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2 Delivering the Games against an 
immovable deadline 
8. The Olympics will begin in London on 27 July 2012, with the Paralympics following 
from 29 August to 9 September 2012. The Olympic Delivery Authority highlighted the 
scale of the logistical challenge that staging the Games would represent, the equivalent of 
33 world championships being held simultaneously in one city. The Authority’s delivery 
programme from the award of the Games to London in July 2005 included: two years to 
acquire and prepare the land, secure planning permissions, and do the design work and 
procurement; four years to build the venues and infrastructure; and one year to fit out the 
venues and stage test events.10 
9. The Department and the Olympic Delivery Authority had been working together to get 
key projects underway in the 18 months since London was chosen to host the Games. 
Work had begun immediately on the time critical project to re-route underground the 
power lines on the area of the Olympic Park and the work was on track to be completed on 
schedule and within budget. During Summer 2008 power was planned to be switched from 
overground to underground, allowing removal of the overhead cables and electricity 
pylons, and freeing up the Olympic Park site for development.11 
10. Progress had also been made in a number of other areas: the London Development 
Agency now owned 93% of the land required for the Olympic Park; the masterplan for the 
design of the Olympic Park had been revised and finalised; a draft transport plan for the 
Games had been issued; and most recently the Olympic Delivery Authority had begun 
exclusive negotiations with Lend Lease and Westfield for the development of the Olympic 
Village.12 
 
10 C&AG’s Report, paras 11, 13; Q 30 
11 C&AG’s Report, para 16; Qq 14–15, 53 
12 Qq 32, 53, 86 
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3 The requirement for the budget to be 
clearly determined and effectively 
managed 
11. The Department first started to develop cost estimates for the Games in 2002 before the 
decision to bid had been made. At the time of our examination, however, 20 months after 
London was awarded the Games, there was still no final agreed budget in place.13 
12. The Department initiated a thorough and detailed review of costs as soon as London 
had been awarded the Games, but a number of cost and funding issues still had to be 
resolved. The Department confirmed, however, that additional public funding would be 
required.14 
13. At the time of London’s bid, the costs expected to be covered by the public sector 
funding package for the Games (comprising funding from the National Lottery, the 
Greater London Authority and the London Development Agency) totalled £2.254 billion. 
The Department was also co-ordinating Exchequer funding of £1.044 billion to cover the 
costs of ‘non-Olympic’ infrastructure on the site of the Olympic Park, which would have 
been incurred as part of planned regeneration but were being brought forward for the 
Games. The Department said that the cost estimates at the time of the bid had been based 
on a thorough process, and reflected the outline plans that had been developed at that 
stage.15 
14. In November 2006 the Secretary of State reported to the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee that overall the cost estimates for the Olympic Park had increased by some 
£900 million. The increase included some £400 million for IT and site mobilisation and the 
costs of the CLM Consortium, appointed by the Olympic Delivery Authority as its Delivery 
Partner to assist in project managing the delivery of the venues and infrastructure. The 
original budget had used the costs of an urban development corporation as a benchmark 
for the Olympic Delivery Authority’s running costs, with the result that these costs had 
been seriously underestimated.16 
15. The Department was committed to keeping costs under control and delivering value 
for money. The re-design of the layout of the Olympic Park had produced cost savings of 
some £600 million, and the design of individual venues, including the Aquatics Centre, was 
being looked at with a view to reducing costs.17 
 
 
 
13 C&AG’s Report, paras 41, 54; Q 7 
14 Qq 6–7, 13, 36 
15 C&AG’s Report, paras 42, 51, 71, Figure 4; Q 54 
16 C&AG’s Report, para 56, 78; Qq 142–143 
17 Q 26 
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16. At the time of our hearing, a number of significant areas of uncertainty remained 
before the budget could be finalised.18 
x Tax – The Department explained that tax had been excluded from the cost 
estimates at the time of the bid on the basis that the tax treatment could not be 
resolved until the delivery structures for the Games were in place.19 
x Contingency provision – The cost estimates at the time of the bid had included a 
contingency provision in respect of individual projects, but the Department now 
considered that an overall programme contingency margin was required to reflect 
the interdependencies between projects and the risks associated with the knock-on 
effect that problems on one project could have on the rest of the programme.20 
x Security – It had not been possible at the time of the bid to provide a reliable 
estimate of the costs of policing and wider security, and the Department had 
notified Parliament of a contingent liability in this respect. The Olympic Security 
Co-ordinator was now working up plans and budgets in association with the 
Home Office and the Metropolitan Police.21 
x Private sector funding – At the time of the bid, £738 million of private funding 
had been expected to help meet costs associated with the Olympic Park. In the light 
of further work and advice, the Department now considered there was insufficient 
time to negotiate contracts with the private sector within the overall timescale for 
the Games, so there was now little prospect of securing significant private sector 
funding to deliver the Olympic Park. However, most of the funding for the 
Olympic Village was still expected to come from the private sector.22 
17. The Department expected the budget would be finalised soon and in the event the 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport announced a revised budget totalling over 
£9 billion to Parliament on 15 March 2007, 10 days after our hearing.23 
18. As required by the International Olympic Committee, the government is the ultimate 
guarantor of funding for the Games, including underwriting the costs of the venues and 
infrastructure. The government has also underwritten the cost of any shortfall between 
LOCOG’s costs and revenues, although LOCOG is expected to be self-financing.24 
19. LOCOG has a budget of some £2 billion for staging the Games, which is expected to be 
financed by contributions from the International Olympic Committee, global and local 
sponsors, commercial marketing and ticketing. It will also receive some public funding in 
2012 towards the cost of the Paralympics. The Department said that LOCOG was clear that 
 
18 Q 21 
19 Q 56 
20 Qq 59, 62, 190 
21 Qq 122, 147 
22 C&AG’s Report, Figures 4, 6; Qq 178–181 
23 Q 6 
24 C&AG’s Report, paras 40, 60 
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it had to control its costs and maximise its income to avoid having to call on public 
subsidy.25 
20. As well as the amount of funding for the Games, the timing of funding is also 
important so the Olympic Delivery Authority has money available to pay its bills and take 
the delivery programme forward promptly. Early forecasts indicated, however, that in all 
but one year the Olympic Delivery Authority’s demand for funds was projected to exceed 
the supply. The Department was keeping cashflow under regular review to ensure that the 
Olympic Delivery Authority did not run out of money.26 
 
25 C&AG’s Report, paras 59–61; Qq 18–19 
26 C&AG’s Report, para 52; Q 127 
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4 Applying effective procurement practices 
21. The Olympic programme will involve extensive procurement activity in the coming 
years in relation to both the construction of the venues and infrastructure and the staging 
of the Games. Strong procurement practices will be needed to achieve value for money and 
ensure contracts are awarded in an open and fair way in line with best practice.27 
22. The Olympic Delivery Authority has developed a procurement policy, with help from 
the Office of Government Commerce, which sets out best practice and will guide the way 
in which the Authority carries out its procurement. The Olympic Delivery Authority is also 
among the signatories to the ‘2012 Construction Commitments’ which set out good 
practice principles in six areas of the construction process—client leadership; procurement 
and integration; design; sustainability; commitment to people; and health and safety.28 
23. The Games are expected to account for 2% of construction activity across the country 
over a five year period (12% of activity in London) and there were plans to provide training 
to develop the skills of local people, with money available from the London Development 
Agency. The Olympic Delivery Authority was working with the construction industry and 
the trade unions to maximise direct employment (rather than self-employment) as far as 
possible as this gave greater control, particularly over health and safety; but the Authority 
thought that insisting on using only directly employed labour would risk driving away 
potential contractors.29 
24. The Olympic Delivery Authority’s first major procurement exercise, completed in 
September 2006, was the appointment of the CLM Consortium as its Delivery Partner. 
CLM had been appointed following a detailed tendering and vetting process and would 
supplement the Olympic Delivery Authority’s own resources with experience from five 
previous Games and the Heathrow Terminal Five project. They would support in the 
delivery of the Olympic venues and infrastructure, including through the provision of 
project and programme planning and management services.30 
 
27 C&AG’s Report, paras 78–79 
28 C&AG’s Report, paras 81–83 
29 Qq 219, 222–224 
30 C&AG’s Report, para 78; Qq 51, 142 
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5 Planning for a lasting legacy 
25. The prospect of the legacy that hosting the Games would bring was central to London’s 
bid. The broad concept of legacy encompasses the sports venues that will remain after 
2012, the regeneration of the local area, and the wider benefits that the Games are expected 
to bring.31 
26. Five new venues will remain on the Olympic Park site following the Games, including 
the main Stadium, and providing for legacy is central to the thinking on design and 
construction. The design of the venues has an impact not just on the construction costs but 
also on maintenance and operating costs in the longer term, and the Olympic Board had 
asked for the Aquatics Centre to be re-designed to improve its legacy use and reduce cost.32 
27. Developing detailed legacy plans is the responsibility of project groups for each venue, 
involving representatives from the Olympic Delivery Authority, LOCOG and other 
stakeholders. Key questions to be resolved include who will own the individual venues after 
the Games, who will cover conversion and running costs, and the extent to which the 
venues will be available for sporting use by local communities. The Olympic Delivery 
Authority was working with the public authorities in the local area and the relevant 
sporting bodies on these matters, and was seeking to bring in revenue streams to ensure the 
venues would be financially sustainable.33 
28. One of the objectives for the Games is to maximise the economic, social, health and 
environmental benefits for the UK, particularly through regeneration and sustainable 
development in East London. This objective had been broken down into sub-objectives 
and work was continuing to develop delivery plans with detailed milestones and outputs, 
but these had not been put not in place by the end of 2006 as intended. Work on wider 
benefits was also being done by LOCOG’s Nations and Regions Groups which were 
seeking to ensure the impact of the Games was felt across the country.34 
29. The regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley in East London, one of the most 
disadvantaged parts of the UK, was expected to take a huge step forward because of the 
Games. Major progress would be made within the next five years, well in advance of what 
would otherwise have been achieved. The legacy effect would be measured in the long run 
in terms of the impact on indices of education, health and worklessness. In addition, 16,000 
homes were expected to come from the Olympic Park site and the wider Stratford 
development, half of which would be ‘affordable housing’ for renting and shared equity 
purchase.35 
 
31 C&AG’s Report, para 84 
32 C&AG’s Report, paras 85–86; Q 26 
33 C&AG’s Report, paras 85–86; Q 107 
34 C&AG’s Report, paras 90–92; Qq 197–199, 204 
35 C&AG’s Report, para 88; Qq 45, 67, 209–213 
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6 Effective progress monitoring and risk 
management arrangements 
30. Effective progress monitoring and risk management will be essential to the successful 
delivery of the Olympic programme, with its multiple stakeholders, many individual 
projects and inherent interdependencies in delivering the programme as a whole. The 
Olympic Board is responsible for overseeing progress and managing risk at programme 
level, supported by a Steering Group of senior officials and the Olympic Programme 
Support Unit. The Unit is a small group which works with stakeholders to collate 
information and provide independent advice to the Board.36 
31. The vision for the Olympic programme (“to host an inspirational, safe and inclusive 
Olympic and Paralympic Games and leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK”) 
had been translated into four strategic objectives and 42 sub-objectives, assigned to 17 lead 
stakeholders. These would provide the framework for progress reporting and, when they 
had been finalised, the delivery plans for each sub-objective would include outcomes and 
milestones, against which progress could be measured. Stakeholders were at different 
stages, however, in developing their individual strategies for identifying and managing the 
risks specific to delivering their responsibilities.37 
32. The Olympic Delivery Authority provided regular reports to the Olympic Board and 
attended meetings to discuss progress. With a major construction programme of this kind 
it was, however, inevitable that it would miss some deadlines. In that event, it would have 
to re-programme work and look at how to make up time in other areas. It was seeking to 
bring forward as much work as possible with the aim of delivering the venues and 
infrastructure 12 months ahead of the Games so LOCOG had time for test events and 
other preparations.38 
 
36 C&AG’s Report, paras 93–94; Q 77 
37 C&AG’s Report, paras 26, 97–98, 100, Appendix 5; Q 77 
38 Qq 102–104, 131 
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7 The impact on the other National Lottery 
good causes 
33. The public sector funding package for the Games agreed by the Government and the 
Mayor of London in 2003 included £1.5 billion of funding from the National Lottery. This 
comprised £750 million from new designated Olympic lottery games, £340 million from 
the sports lottery distributors, and £410 million from general lottery proceeds, to be 
derived from a change to the allocations to the non-Olympic good causes after 2009.39 
34. Returns to date from the designated Olympic lottery games had been slightly higher 
than projected, with some £118 million expected to be raised in 2006–07 against a target of 
£110 million. The Olympic lottery games would, however, reduce the money available to 
the other good causes (the arts; sport; heritage; charities and voluntary groups; and health, 
education and environment projects) by diverting sales from the mainstream lottery 
games. Some 77% of the money to be raised by the designated lottery games (£575 million 
of the total of £750 million) may come from players switching from existing games.40 
35. Overall lottery income has grown over recent years, and the Department hoped that 
continued growth would help to minimise the impact on the other good causes. The 
impact of the designated Olympic lottery games, however, together with the transfer from 
general lottery proceeds, would mean that around £1 billion (£575 million plus £410 
million) would to be diverted from the non-Olympic good causes over the period to 2012–
13, approximately 10% of expected lottery proceeds.41 
36. The revised budget subsequently announced by the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport on 15 March 2007 increased the total lottery funding for the Games to 
£2.2 billion, by raising the amount to be transferred from general lottery proceeds after 
2009 by £675 million, taking to about £1.7 billion the amount to be diverted from the non-
Olympic good causes. 
 
 
39 C&AG’s Report, paras 46–50, Figure 5 
40 C&AG’s Report, para 48; Q 16 
41 Qq 33, 48–49 
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Oral evidence
Taken before the Committee of Public Accounts
on Monday 5 March 2007
Members present:
Mr Edward Leigh (Chairman) Mr Philip Dunne
Mr Richard Bacon Helen Goodman
Annette Brooke Mr Sadiq Khan
Mr David Curry Mr Don Touhig
Mr Ian Davidson Mr Iain Wright
Sir John Bourn KCB, Comptroller and Auditor General, Mr Tim Burr, Deputy Comptroller and Auditor
General, andMr Keith Hawkswell, Director, National Audit OYce were in attendance.
Paula Diggle, Treasury OYcer of Accounts, andMr Dan Rosenfield, HM Treasury, were in attendance.
REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL
PREPARATIONS FOR THE LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES—RISK
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (HC 252)
Witnesses: Jonathan Stephens, Permanent Secretary, and JeV Jacobs, Chief Executive of the Government
Olympic Executive, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and David Higgins, Chief Executive,
Olympic Delivery Authority, gave evidence.
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. Our hearing today
is on the Comptroller and Auditor General’s
Report, Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic
and Paralympic Games—Risk assessment and
management. This is the first of what will no doubt
be a series of reports on the games between now
and 2012 and probably several reports after 2012.
We welcome Jonathan Stephens, the Permanent
Secretary at the Department for Culture, Media
and Sport, the lead Government Department on
the games. We also welcome JeV Jacobs, who is
the Chief Executive of the Government Olympic
Executive within the Department, and David
Higgins, who is Chief Executive of the Olympic
Delivery Authority. You are all very welcome. I
shall address my questions to you, Mr Stephens, but
of course you can farm them out.
Who is in charge of these games?
Jonathan Stephens: The Olympic Board is
responsible for the delivery of the games and
there are two very clear bodies responsible for
delivering on the ground: the Olympic Delivery
Authority is responsible for the construction
and infrastructure—building the games; and the
organising committee is responsible for the running
of the games.
Q2 Chairman: That sounds very logical, but if you
look at figure 2 on page 10 there is a massively
complicated structure. There is no single person in
overall control, is there? For instance, this is a recipe
for arguments and delay, particularly between
whoever happens to be Secretary of State and the
Mayor.
Jonathan Stephens: There is a very clear delivery
structure. There is one body that is responsible—
Q3 Chairman: There is no one person in overall
control. There is nobody where the buck stops, is
there? That is the problem.
Jonathan Stephens: Fundamentally, at the heart
of delivering any Olympic games is a tripartite
relationship between the Olympic movement, the
host city, which is actually in receipt of the contract
from the International Olympic Committee, and the
host Government, who are required to underpin the
games with a guarantee. There is no escaping that
fundamental tripartite relationship. This structure
has established very clear, purpose-built delivery
vehicles, learning the lessons from previous games
andmajor projects in this country: one body focused
on the construction and infrastructure; one body
focused on running the event as a show. The rest of
this is essentially ensuring that all the key partners
work eVectively together.
Q4 Chairman: I understand all that. I am going to
ask you in a moment about the budget, and why
there is no overall agreed budget at the moment, but
if we are talking about somebody being responsible,
can we at least have an assurance from you, as
Accounting OYcer, that you will not get oV this
bus—that you are going to remain responsible to
this Committee up to 2012 and beyond? That is your
current intention, is it?
Jonathan Stephens: Absolutely.
Q5 Chairman:Accounting for themonies coming to
these games from the taxpayer?
Jonathan Stephens: Absolutely. I am looking
forward to that. I have additional Accounting
OYcers in the Chief Executive of the delivery
authority and the Chief Executive of the organising
committee.
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Q6 Chairman: Why is there no final agreed budget
for these games?
Jonathan Stephens: As soon as the games were won
the Department instituted a full and thorough
review of the costs, as the Secretary of State said
would need to happen, when setting out the original
funding package. That was the first opportunity to
undertake a thorough review of costs in the
knowledge that the games had been won; with the
delivery structures for the games in place; and now
with the delivery partner that will work with the
Olympic Delivery Authority also in place. That
process has—rightly—been thorough and detailed.
It is close to, but has not yet reached, a conclusion.
I hope that that will happen very soon.
Q7 Chairman:What worries me is that it is now one
year and eight months since we were awarded the
games. Is it not ridiculous that in a developed
country, one should have to wait that length of time
to have any clear idea of what the cost to the
taxpayer will be?
Jonathan Stephens:The process that was put in hand
immediately after the award of the games was, as I
said, the first opportunity to thoroughly re-evaluate
costs, and to plan on the basis of something other
than a specimen games.
Q8 Chairman: The bid was a pig in a poke as far as
the taxpayer is concerned?
Jonathan Stephens: Not at all: I have a substantial
pile ofReports onwhich the bid was based. Far from
being a pig in a poke, the bid was based on thorough
estimates that were relevant at the time, and which
reflected the planning that was appropriate for the
bid process.
Q9 Chairman: So the bid was not a pig in poke?
The original cost, we were told, was going to be
£2,992 million. We were also told that private sector
funding was going to be £738 million, a claim that
has faded into the mist, I understand. The Secretary
of State for Culture, Media and Sport has
already announced a further £900 million of
costs. Therefore, the figure is £2,992 million, plus
£738 million, plus £900 million and rising, and we
still do not have a final, agreed budget. Do you not
think that you owe it to the taxpayers of this country
to have your act together by now?
Jonathan Stephens: A thorough process of cost
review is under way—
Chairman: You keep saying that, but it is not an
answer to my question.
Jonathan Stephens: The process has not yet reached
a conclusion, although it is very near to doing so. It
is right that the cost review is thorough, based on
professional advice, and that it reflects the advice of
the delivery authorities and delivery partners. The
Secretary of State provided an update on the process
when she appeared before the Culture, Media and
Sport Committee last autumn. The process is not
yet resolved.
The state of aVairs is essentially as set out in the
National Audit OYce Report. As you said, at the
time of the bid, the costs were estimated at £3 billion,
as identified in table 4 of the Report, plus the extra
£1 billion for regeneration and infrastructure
identified in paragraph 51. When the Secretary of
State Reported to the Culture, Media and Sport
Committee, she identified an increase in costs that
were known at that stage of £900million. She also set
out a number of unresolved issues.
Q10 Chairman: Can I stop you there? You have hit
on another problem. I mentioned figures.We still do
not have any figures for security, tax treatment or
contingencies. Those massive, unresolved figures
have not yet been given to Parliament. When can
you provide to Parliament something approaching a
view of a final budget? Do you not owe us that?
When will you be doing it?
Jonathan Stephens: The Government want to
provide a final budget—
Q11 Chairman: When?
Jonathan Stephens: Soon, but I do not have a date.
Q12 Chairman: Will it be in weeks, days, months
or years?
Jonathan Stephens: All I can say is that it will be
soon.
Q13 Chairman:What does that mean?
Jonathan Stephens: It means soon. The position, as
reflected in the NAO Report, is that there are
a number of unresolved issues concerning the
approach to costs, funding and other treatments of
the matter, which are being actively considered.
Q14 Chairman: How can people who are
developing stadiums and so on press on with their
programmes when they do not have a final, agreed
budget? Having no ceilings is a recipe for an open-
ended cheque book.
The problem is that I have encouraged the whole
process, by saying to the Comptroller and Auditor
General, whose Report we are discussing, that
we must not have a repeat of previous Olympic
disasters, something with which he agrees.
Therefore, for once, we are not going to look at the
situation after the games; we are going to look at it
again and again in the run-up. However, in the run-
up, we want a reassurance from you that you have a
firm grip on the situation.
Jonathan Stephens: We want to get to a
comprehensive budget as soon as possible. That is
now recognised across Government as urgent, and I
hope that it will soon result in progress. In the
meantime, the record over the past year is that
the Department, working with the ODA, has
successfully got the key projects under way. We
identified the key risk in terms of cost and time as
the failure to get under way the underground
installation of critical power lines. That work was
put in place immediately after the bid, and it is
currently on track to complete on schedule.
Q15 Chairman: I have no doubt that you are doing
good work, that the power lines are being laid and
all of the rest of it, and that it will be an excellent
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Olympic games, but the Committee is here to look
after taxpayers’ interests. Do you understand that?
We want to have from you very soon a reassurance
on that.
Jonathan Stephens:Absolutely. The point that I was
just making about power lines was a demonstration
of that. That was the key early underpinning risk on
which everything else depended. If we had failed to
get that in place, if it had failed to proceed to
schedule, it would have stacked up massive time
delays and cost increases down the line.
Q16 Chairman: I want to let others come in now,
but I have one last question that I must ask you.
Paragraph 48 on page 15 states that: “the latest
estimates supplied by Camelot to the National
Lottery Commission are that 77% (some £575
million) may be diverted from the non-Olympic
good causes.” Do you not think that the games will
dry up funding for other good causes?
Jonathan Stephens: There is no evidence of that. In
fact, in 2004–05 and 2005–06, income to the lottery
as a whole increased substantially. The Olympic
lottery is currently running slightly ahead of its
target and expectations. We expect it to generate
something like £118 million this year as opposed to
a target of £110 million. As we have always
acknowledged, there will be some diversion for our
Olympic lottery games from existing good causes.
Chairman: I put it to you that there must be.
Q17 Helen Goodman:Mr Stephens, I think that the
Chairman has been slightly kind to you about the
Olympic costs. Looking through the Report, I can
see that £2.99 billionwas the original bid cost. As the
Chairman has said, we are not expecting to get £738
million from the private sector. The Secretary of
State announced a cost escalation of £900 million.
Then there is an additional amount for the reserve,
the VAT and security, which I am told will be in the
range of 30 to 60%, so that will be something
between an extra £1.3 billion and £2.6 billion. Then
there is £1.44 billion on infrastructure, £665 million
to buy the land and £2.465 billion for staging,
according to the bid. All that adds up to something
in the range of £9.4 billion to £10.6 billion. Do you
accept those numbers?
Jonathan Stephens: I recognise some of the numbers.
In particular, the budget of £2 billion for the staging
of the games, run by the organising committee, was
in the bid document. It has always been published
and on the basis that it would be self-financing.
Therefore, where there has been general discussion
of the budget, that figure has generally been
excluded. I also recognise the figure of roughly
£650million or so for the cost of the land. That again
has been in the public domain for a long time and has
also generally been excluded from the costs that are
relevant to the public sector funding package
because the London Development Agency, having
purchased the land, will own it and will gain the
proceeds from disposal in the end. I recognise those
figures but I think that it is a mistake to add them to
previous figures and to compare them with some
earlier budget.
Q18 Helen Goodman: Why?
Jonathan Stephens: Simply because the LOCOG
budget is self-financing. The costs of staging will be
£2 billion, but that is covered by a combination of
International Olympic Committee contribution,
global and local sponsors, commercial marketing
and ticketing.
Q19 Helen Goodman: Do you not think that
controlling the cost of staging matters as well? Do
you not think that it matters if the tickets to attend
the events will be way beyond the pockets of most of
our constituents? Do you not think that if the costs
for staging are too high and you look for private
sector sponsorship there, you are even less likely to
get the £738 million in on the setting-up costs? Do
you not need to take a tough approach to the
overall costs?
Jonathan Stephens: It is absolutely critical that there
is no impact from the staging of the games. Other
than the small subsidy always made clear for the
staging of the Paralympics, there is no subsidy for
the staging of the games—for the LOCOGbudget—
from the public sector. That is the basis on which
LOCOG is operating. It is very clear about that. It is
applying rigorous controls to its costs and, equally,
is seeking to maximise its revenue to achieve that.
Q20 Helen Goodman:Well, even without that, there
is a grand total of £8 billion. Do you think that is a
reasonable cost?
Jonathan Stephens:As I said, the cost review process
is still under way; Ministers have not taken final
decisions on that.
Q21 Helen Goodman: Do you think the costs will
fall from that figure, or do you think they will go up?
Jonathan Stephens: I am sorry: I am not in a position
to confirm any particular costs attributed to the
unresolved items set out in table 6, which remain, as
we speak, subject to discussion, further advice and
consideration.
Q22 Helen Goodman: What do you think the tax
concessions will cost the Exchequer?
Jonathan Stephens: Other than the well established
treatment of LOCOG for tax purposes, which is a
requirement of any IOC bid and has already been
factored into the budget, I am not aware of any
further costs that have not already been announced.
Q23 Helen Goodman: We passed changes in last
year’s Finance Bill to make various exemptions.
Were you not aware of that?
Jonathan Stephens: Yes. That covers the treatment
of the organising committee, which is a requirement
under the operations of the IOC, and any costs will
have been factored into the public finance estimates
at the time.
Q24 Helen Goodman: But you do not know what
they are? They are of no concern to you?
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Jonathan Stephens: I am happy to write with any
further details.1
Q25 Helen Goodman: When the Chairman asked
you to look at the diagram, you responded that the
Olympic Board was in charge and then you pointed
to the two bodies below the Olympic Board, but
you did not mention another organisation, which
seems to me to be driving this very firmly—the
InternationalOlympic Committee (IOC). Is it not an
organisation that has complete power and no
responsibility? It demands certain things when it
doles out the games, but it has no responsibility for
raising the money.
Jonathan Stephens: Obviously, the IOC holds the
rights to the games, and wemounted a bid to run the
games. The IOC makes a significant contribution to
the costs of staging the games, which is reflected in
the LOCOG budget.
Q26 Helen Goodman:But we signed a contract with
the IOC. Are you saying that that contract is
completely open-ended with respect to finances, so
that we may have thought that the total costs would
come to £5 billion but if they come to £8 billion, well,
the IOC can require us to spend another £3 billion?
Jonathan Stephens: Far from it. We are absolutely
determined to keep costs under strict control to
ensure we deliver value for money while meeting the
responsibilities under the contract. Of course, the
Government have undertaken, as a condition of
making a bid, to underwrite the costs of the games.
That certainly does not in any way imply that the
costs are open-ended. We already have a record of
reviewing costs as they come through to us. The
Olympic Board has asked for the aquatics centre to
be redesigned to improve its legacy use and to take
cost out. The redesign of the master plan last
summer for the Olympic park avoided some
£600 million of costs by redesigning the lay-out of
the park. The same process is under way now with
the main stadium. This is a record over the past 18
months of looking very hard at costs as they come
through, and continually seeking to control and
revise them.
Q27 Helen Goodman: Are you aware of what is
proposed to be spent on temporary—temporary, not
permanent—sites?
Jonathan Stephens: Mr Higgins is responsible for
delivering that.
David Higgins: There is a wide variety of both
permanent and—
Q28 Helen Goodman: Can you tell the Committee
what the number is please?
David Higgins: I do not know the exact number.
Q29 Helen Goodman: Well, I will tell you, then. It
is more than $240 million. Have you heard of
something that happened in 1520, whenKing Henry
VIII met the French king?
1 Ev 23
David Higgins: The field of the cloth of gold.
Q30 Helen Goodman: Yes. There was special
landscaping and the whole thing was completely
fantastic.Would you say that theOlympic games are
a latter-day field of the cloth of gold?
David Higgins: I would say that the Olympics is the
world’s largest peacetime event ever held. It is 33
world championships held simultaneously in one
city, so it is by far the largest logistical event ever
occurring in the world outside a reasonable sized
war. For a country to win the obligation and
privilege to hold it is a great—
Q31 Helen Goodman: So we should be grateful for
the bill?
David Higgins: The amount of competition around
the world to hold future Olympics is now increasing
and more competitive.
Q32 Helen Goodman: I wonder whether you are
aware of what was said about accommodation—I
think members of the Committee will find this quite
ironic. Under the heading “Accommodation: it’s the
little things that matter”—I do not know whether
you think the bill is little—the document said: “We
want the Olympic Village to meet the individual
needs of every guest.” That is absolutely fine of
course, but the document continues: “Going beyond
core services of the highest standard, we hope
to surprise and delight Village residents by
incorporating all the little things that will make the
Village special.” Do you think that the price that
attaches to this event could be described as little?
Jonathan Stephens: The price of the village will be
met almost exclusively from private sector funding.
Only last week the Olympic Delivery Authority
announced exclusive negotiations with Lend Lease,
alongside Westfield, for the development of the
village. It is part of a major redevelopment funded
almost exclusively by the private sector for the whole
of Stratford. I am confident that that element of cost
will be met almost exclusively by the private sector
and that there will be a permanent legacy of that, in
the form of close to 4,000 homes, directly from the
village. It is also important that the facilities in the
village will include facilities for our Paralympic
athletes, who will have full disabled access
throughout.
Q33 Helen Goodman:Well, that is true, but it is also
the case that the £10 billion that it looks like we are
going to spend could also pay for 100,000 homes. I
also think that the Chairman was too kind to you on
the siphoning oV from the voluntary sector. I
wonder whether you could look at chart 5. The text
says that the amount of: “Proceeds from designated
Olympic lottery games”, which will be diverted from
other good causes, comes to £575 million, while the
“General lottery proceeds”, which will come from
the national lottery distribution fund, come to
£410 million. Does that not mean that, in total,
£985 million that would otherwise have gone to the
rest of the voluntary sector is going to go to the
Olympic games?
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Jonathan Stephens: It is absolutely true that roughly
£1 billion will be diverted from one set of good
causes funded under the national lottery to another,
namely the Olympics. Over the period up to
2012–13, that amount will be roughly 10% of the
total anticipated proceeds from the lottery.
HelenGoodman: I want to ask one final question.Do
you want me to hold on and ask later, Chairman?
Chairman: Go on.
Q34 HelenGoodman:Myfinal question is about the
end of the Report, where it is said that some of the
spend is going to benefit the regions. How much of
the spend is going to benefit the north-east?
Jonathan Stephens: I do not have a figure for
that. The opportunities for the UK as a whole
to benefit will include, of course, participation
in and attendance at the event, participation in
the volunteering programme and the business
opportunities that other games have successfully
demonstrated, which host country companies can
benefit from. We are engaged with each region—
including the north-east—and each will produce a
plan for the benefits that it hopes to deliver on top of
the games. As we speak, planning is going on in the
north-east about the particular benefits.
Q35 Chairman: In answer to Mrs Goodman,
you mentioned the Government’s underwriting
guarantee and then quickly hurried on—I do not
blame you. With costs going up and up, it is just a
matter of time before that is called on, is it not?
Jonathan Stephens: I am sorry, I missed the end.
Chairman: You mentioned, very briefly, the
Government’s underwriting guarantee, which is
absolutely crucial. You did not develop your
answer. With costs going up and up, it is only a
matter of time before that is invoked.
Jonathan Stephens: No. In terms of the guarantee
underpinning the costs of staging the games, we are
clear that our aim and that of the organising
committee is to ensure that they are self-financing.
The costs are being rigorously considered to ensure
that and there are also a variety of sources of
income—
Q36 Chairman: I was not asking about the staging,
necessarily. It is the rest of it that we are worried
about.
Jonathan Stephens:As the Report makes clear, there
will be additional public sector funding. Ministers
set out the need for that, reflecting in particular the
regeneration and infrastructure development.
Chairman: Okay. Thank you.
Q37 Mr Khan:Mr Higgins may have answered one
of my questions, but let us be clear. Is this project the
biggest project of its kind, in terms of both size and
numbers, that we have undertaken in this country?
David Higgins: Most definitely. It is the biggest
project to stage—it is 33 world championships and
16,000 athletes. Unlike other world championship
events, it all takes place in one city and one Olympic
village. In terms of the delivery of the project, it is by
far the biggest project that has ever been achieved in
this country.
Q38 Mr Khan:You said in the world, not just in the
UK. Is that right?
David Higgins: Maybe it is not bigger than The
Palms in Dubai or something like that, and there is
a massive amount of work happening in China, but
certainly in the UK it is by far the largest project
being carried out.
Q39 Mr Khan: The IOC said some complimentary
things about the progress that had been made in
November last year. Can you give us the context of
where the Athens games, the Sydney games and the
Beijing games, which are coming up shortly, were at
the same stage and compare that with where you
are?
David Higgins: They are all quite diVerent games. I
was involved in Sydney; I was in charge of the
company that delivered the Olympic village, the
aquatics centre and the athletics centre. I know
Sydney reasonably well. It was a diVerent site,
because it was much larger. It was already owned by
theGovernment, whichmade it easy from that point
of view. However, Sydney had a lot of changes—
that would be the way to describe it—in structure
until it got the model that is now used for London.
We have used an enormous amount of experience
from Sydney and a lot of advice about the lessons
learned. Sydneywas heralded as the best games ever.
The reason for that was the experience of the public
and of the athletes. It was the little things that
mattered: the way that the athletes arrived at the
village and school kids had prepared all their
rooms—
Q40 Mr Khan:What about Beijing?
David Higgins: I have been to Beijing, but not in this
role. The village in Beijing was started, what, a
year ago—
Q41 Mr Khan: A year ago?
David Higgins: When we speak to the IOC—they
were here last week, and I presented to them, as
did a number of staV in the ODA—they were
very satisfied. The IOC is concerned about the
planning—it is an intelligent client, with significant
project management capability, and it is not only the
senior management team that arrives. Next month,
for example, the whole transport team—experts
on transport—will come. The worldwide head of
construction was here last year. The committee
comes as a smart client and vet every single thing we
do. We had two full days of presentations—
Q42 Mr Khan:What is the downside of not having
your budget finalised five years in advance of the
games?
David Higgins: Compared with others such as
Sydney, which I think had its budget two years
before the opening—
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Q43 Mr Khan: Two weeks or two years?
David Higgins: Two years. In 1998—the games were
held in 2000—the budget was publicised in 1998.
Beijing is talking about a revised budget. I am not
sure if it has finally been published, but they
certainly spoke about a revised budget four years
after having won the games, and Athens disclosed a
budget after the games.
Q44 Mr Khan: One of the concerns—Mrs
Goodman referred to this—was about the benefit
that those outside of the five boroughs might get
from the games. I have a big question about the
benefits that Tooting may or may not get, but I shall
save that for a private sitting.
Would you say that any benefits gained by Beijing
from the Olympic site are far outweighed by the
benefits that China will receive from staging the
games in 2008? Can you quantify the benefits that a
host country can gain from hosting the Olympics?
David Higgins:Countries use the games for diVerent
things. China is using them to publicise its level of
economic development and Beijing’s and China’s
sophistication. There are massive investments, of
course. The airport in Beijing is huge. A new metro
system will be installed in time for the games, and
there will be huge upgrades in the city. China is using
the games for that. Barcelona used the games to link
large parts of the city and its infrastructure. How
Barcelona prospered from the games is history.
Q45 Mr Khan: Does it cause you frustration that
some of the non-Olympic benefits—the regeneration
of the five boroughs, the public infrastructure and
the non-Olympic costs—are included when it comes
to quantifying the costs of the games?
David Higgins: Does it cause me frustration? The
reason I do the job, in the end, is for the regeneration
and the legacy for east London. I amquite convinced
that without the games it would never have
happened. The final end-value of Stratford alone,
excluding anything spent on the Olympic parks, is
over £7 billion. If we compare that to projects like
King’s Cross—the first development plans were
made in 1988 and awarded in 2000—Greenwich,
Ebbsfleet, Elephant and Castle, and Paddington, we
will see that the former will be substantially finished
within five years; 50% of Stratford will be complete,
which is unheard of with developments of that scale.
The regeneration of the Lea Valley will take a huge
step forward because of the Olympics.
Jonathan Stephens: It is absolutely right to identify
the fact that regeneration is at the heart of the games.
As the Government said in the bid document, they
recognise the need for extra public and private sector
funding on top of the public sector package that was
originally identified. It is also critical that it is
delivered as an integrated project. That is why the
Olympic Delivery Authority is delivering both the
core games, with their venues, and the wider
infrastructure development and regeneration.
Q46 Mr Khan: One of the other concerns was that
other good causes might not receive the benefits that
they would have received but for lottery money
being used for the Olympics. Camelot has now won
the most recent—I am sorry, but we are still in the
bidding phase are we not?
Jonathan Stephens: It is still in the bidding, yes.
Q47 Mr Khan:When will that be concluded?
Jonathan Stephens: The evaluation of the bids is due
this summer, and two companies have bid.
Q48 Mr Khan: Has someone asked them whether
they think that the pie will get bigger, or whether a
bigger slice will be given to the Olympics in the next
few years?
Jonathan Stephens:Whichever companywinswill be
under a duty to maximise the take to the national
lottery, regardless of where it is going. It is true that
the impact on non-Olympic good causes will be
minimised if we can grow the take from the lottery
as a whole, and that is very much the outcome that
we are looking for.
Q49 Mr Khan: At what stage in the next five years
will we know whether money has been taken away
from other good causes because of a drain caused by
the cost of the Olympics? Is there a system whereby
alarm bells will start ringing to tell us if there is a
problem?
Jonathan Stephens: I should make it clear that the
Government have always anticipated that, to some
extent, the running of the Olympic lottery games
will inevitably divert funds from other lottery
games. The original funding package envisaged a
reallocation of some £410 million from the lottery
distributor. The Government have always accepted
that there will be an impact compared to what would
otherwise have been received for non-Olympic good
causes. Of course, the uncertain bit is how much we
can grow the lottery in themeantime. If we can grow
it, as happened in 2004–05 and 2005–06, rather
against the trend for global lotteries, that will reduce
the impact.
Q50 Mr Khan:One of the things that we often see is
big procurement projects being undertaken with
massive overspends and not being built within time.
I understand from the Report that one of the things
that you have done is to use some of the overspend
so far to buy in outside management consultancy
and expertise, to ensure that that does not happen
with the Olympics. What systems do you have in
place to ensure that suYcient alarm bells will start
ringing should that be a concern?
Jonathan Stephens: I will ask Mr Higgins to
comment on that, but may I make it clear, as you
mentioned overspends, that at the moment there
are none?
Q51 Mr Khan: Sorry. I will rephrase that—cost
increases due to higher commodity prices.
Jonathan Stephens: My point is that the Olympic
Delivery Authority has a budget at the moment for
this year. The Olympic Board is considering a
budget for next year. The budget for this year is
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currently slightly under spending, but I will ask
Mr Higgins to comment on cost controls in the
ODA.
David Higgins: You referred to the appointment of
CLM and the Secretary of State’s statements about
an additional £400million, which relate to our hiring
a delivery partner. That sort of work has to happen
anyway, no matter what. Whether we hire a delivery
partner, a programme manager or whatever,
project management, procurement, site supervision,
tendering and risk management are all required for
a project of this scale, particularly because of its
multi-site nature. There are numerous sites, and co-
ordination and logistics make it absolutely
important to manage risk. We went through a
detailed process of tendering and vetting to get a
world-class consortium that has worked on five
previous Olympics and Terminal 5, so it has a lot of
British and international expertise to support our
organisation.
Mr Khan: I think that my time is up. The Chairman
has sent me a note.
Q52 Chairman: Thank you. In answer to Mr Khan,
Mr Higgins, you said that the wider costs and
infrastructure improvements, totalling £6 billion,
would not have happened but for the Olympic
games. Why then did the candidate file state that
funding for those investments was already
committed as part of a long-term investment in
London’s transportation system?
David Higgins: That is very diVerent. That is about
funding for TfL. Does it refer to that—£6 billion in
funding for TfL?
Jonathan Stephens: If I may, I think that that refers
to the established programme of improvements to
the transport infrastructure summarised in the
candidate file. I think that Mr Higgins was referring
to that.
David Higgins: I was referring to that, yes—to
Stratford and the major development in Stratford
town centre. That is planned over a 20-year period
or longer. That was the agreement in place with
LondonContinental prior to the Olympics, and 50%
of that development will be finished within five
years.
Q53 MrCurry:Given thatwe could not even deliver
theDianamemorial fountain, I suppose that it is not
terribly surprising that people are a bit sceptical
about delivering the Olympics. Looking at the
string of sporting venues that never happened,
such as Pickett’s Lock for the World Athletics
Championships, and Wembley, I suppose that it is
only natural that you should be surrounded by a
maze of scepticism. Is that fair?
Jonathan Stephens: I think that we just have to look
at the record during the past 18 months since the
games were won—the critical underground power
lines on which everything else depended, the
contract let and the work going on as we speak, on
schedule, on time and on cost. The land has been
assembled—93% of the land is now in LDA
ownership.
Q54 MrCurry:ButMr Stephens, almost everything
seems to be happening underground as far as the bid
is concerned. When we won the Olympics, there
was a figure attached. Was that figure a punt, a
speculation? Did it bear any relation to reality at all?
When we defended that figure—the figure on the
basis of which we won, presumably—were you
saying to yourself, “Well, we’ve certainly pulled a
fast one with this one, haven’t we?” It is not going to
bear any relation to that at the end, is it? It will be a
figure fromAlice inWonderland, will it not, and not
the original figure?
Jonathan Stephens: On the costs at the time, there
was a very careful and thorough process—
Mr Curry:Which was wrong.
Jonathan Stephens: Which first of all assembled a
specimen games, which was then subject to further
review and to Ministers’ informed decision on the
public sector funding package. That was subject to
an external assessment at the time that there was an
80% probability that the costs could be contained
within it. Having taken the decision to bid, the
Government then took the decision to put
regeneration and the development of infrastructure
at the heart of their bid, thus significantly developing
and enhancing the original concept of the specimen
games. That in turn was underpinned by a further
and thorough review of costs, which sought to
assemble the costs—inevitably, at that stage, only on
the basis of outline plans—to benchmark them
against comparable costs from outside the Olympics
and to assess the risks of their coming in under or
over. The costs of about £4 billion that were set out
at the time of the bid and summarised in the
National Audit OYce Report were reached on that
basis.
We are coming to the conclusion of an even more
detailed review of the costs. This is our first
opportunity to review them on the basis that the
games have been won. We need to move from the
outline plans to the detailed plans on the park,
venues and infrastructure that will have to be
delivered, working with the delivery structures that
are in place and the delivery partner that is in place.
Q55 Mr Curry: Let us go to the other end. Could
you give me a figure beyond which the budget will
not go in any circumstances? Let us assume that
I wanted to have a comfort zone and to be sure
that the figure could never be higher in any
circumstances. Where would you put such a figure?
Jonathan Stephens: I should be clear that our aim is
to keep costs down and under strict control, so the
budget that will be set will be realistic. However, it
should also rightly be taut. No one will give a
guarantee that a particular budget will be met in
100% of circumstances. If we were to do so, that
would suggest very bad value for money.
Q56 Mr Curry: The use of the adjective “taut” in
relation to budgets introduces a new financial
concept. The budget is surrounded by what
Rumsfeld might refer to as the “known unknowns”
and the “unknown unknowns”, is it not? Let us
consider some of what ought to have been the
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known unknowns, such as VAT. At what stage did
it dawn on somebody that VAT might have to be
charged?
Jonathan Stephens: It was known at the time of the
bid that the bid did not include VAT. The basis for
that was the understood and agreed assumption that
it was not possible to sort out the tax treatment until
the delivery structures were in place. That matter
could not be known before the bid was won. In any
case, this is a fundamentally technical issue, in which
money is moving from one arm of Government to
another.
Q57 Mr Curry: So that is a known unknown. Was
the contingency fund an unknown unknown?
Jonathan Stephens: There was project contingency—
Q58 Mr Curry: Can you just update us? According
to the Financial Times, my old alma mater, the
programme contingency will equate to about 40% to
45% of the final budget but the Treasury is likely to
relent on the £2 billion contingency fund for the
Olympics, thus bringing it down to about 20%. Is
that well informed?
Jonathan Stephens: I have no idea, I am afraid.
Q59 Mr Curry: And if you did, you would not tell
us, because you would thus be telling the industry
that it could bid up?
Jonathan Stephens: The Government want to set an
overall comprehensive budget as soon as possible
and they will set out the basis on which they will do
so.We have invited theNAO to examine that budget
once it is set and to Report the basis on which it is
set. I should point out that contingency in respect of
the individual projects was built into the original
estimates at the time of the bid.
Q60 Mr Curry:Will that amount—the contingency
fund—be made public when it is agreed?
Jonathan Stephens: The overall budget will be made
public. We want to ensure that all the structures are
in place to manage costs downwards.
Q61 Mr Curry: No. My question was whether the
amount that corresponds to the contingency will be
separated out in the budget.
Jonathan Stephens: I cannot give a commitment on
that at this stage. Setting the budget in a way that
maximises the control of costs must take priority. I
would not want to do anything that suggested that
there was some notional pot of money against which
contractors should increase their costs.
Q62 Mr Curry: But there is a pot, is there not,
because there will be a contingency fund? Youmight
not tell us how much it is, but there is going to be a
contingency fund. The contractors may be dim, but
they are not as dim as all that.
Jonathan Stephens: That is still under consideration
and discussion;Ministers are still taking advice on it.
I think that it would be prudent tomake contingency
provision across the programme as a whole,
recognising that, as Mr Higgins said, this is one of
the biggest projects delivered in the UK. It is one in
which the projects are interconnected, so there is an
element of risk that sits at the programme level,
rather than the individual project level.
Q63 Mr Curry: So we have had the known
unknowns and the unknown unknowns and we
now have the perhaps suspected unknowns in the
form of the planning gain supplement. Today in
their lordships’ House, the Second Reading of
the Planning-gain Supplement (Preparations) Bill
is being considered. We went through that
extraordinarily brief document a few weeks ago in
this House. If it were introduced, what might it add?
We know precious little about any details, but has it
been budgeted for? Have representations been made
to the Chancellor that it might not be an altogether
good idea in the context of the Olympics?
David Higgins: If I could answer that question, there
will clearly be transitional arrangements put in place
for the project.Much of the project will have already
been approved by the date that that Bill will come
into force. The reason—
Q64 Mr Curry: It would not apply from planning
approval, but from implementation.
David Higgins: Yes, but by 2009 much of the site
will already be under way, with reserved matters
already approved. The Bill envisages transitional
arrangements.
Q65 Mr Curry: Is 2009 the date on which you think
it will be implemented? Is that what you have been
told?
David Higgins: The last brief I saw said 2009–10. I
amnot sure of the final dates, of course; that depends
on Parliament. One of the big reasons for planning
gain supplement is to capture value that comes from
planning, given the—
Q66 Mr Curry: I know the reasons for it; the
argument is about whether it would work and the
implications for this.
David Higgins:Well, on this site, most of the land is
controlled by the Government and therefore the
value uplift is the benefit of the Government in any
case. Planning gain supplement seeks to capture
planning gain from land, which it sometimes does
not control.
Jonathan Stephens: In its document for the
Pre-Budget Report 2006, the Treasury said that the
application of planning gain supplement to major
infrastructure projects and to public sector works
remained under review.
Q67 Mr Curry: How will you measure the
regeneration eVects? We are interested in outcomes;
the Government talk incessantly of targets
and outcomes. How would you measure those
regeneration outcomes? That is the heart of the
project is it not? That’s wot won it, as they say.
David Higgins: You are absolutely right. That is
what the IOC saw; the legacy is a huge feature of
this. The real diVerence now with the Olympics is
that as of 2003, the IOC has required that bidding
cities put legacy at the heart of their bids. How will
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youmeasure it? Youwill measure it in 20 years’ time.
You will measure it against current deprivation; the
four Olympic boroughs, in respect of any indices, sit
in the bottom 10. Three sit in the bottomfive of areas
of the UK. Their statistics on education, health and
worklessness are some of the worst in the country.
The only way you will measure the legacy is in the
long term, when there is proper infrastructure and
schools and when jobs bring activity back into
the community. That is the first measure: the
deprivation indices.
Q68 Mr Curry: This is an example of a classic, top-
down regeneration project, is it not?
David Higgins: You wonder why this area has been
like this for decades and why it has not changed. The
reason why it has not changed is land use. There is
a long, long history of the area being used for post-
industrial industries that have closed and major
utilities that have blighted it. Significant investment
and infrastructure is required to join up the area.
Much of the deprivation comes from the fact that
you cannot get from one side of the valley to the
other.
Q69 Mr Curry: On getting from one side to the
other, is Crossrail an important factor in the success
of the Olympics?
David Higgins: Yes, absolutely. The Olympics is
deconflicted from Crossrail; in fact—
Q70 Mr Curry: What happens if Crossrail does
not happen?
DavidHiggins:One of the big features of this project
is that near-on £1 billion worth of direct work is
going into transportation. So Stratford and West
Hamwill make this area the most connected outside
central London for jobs.
Q71 Mr Curry:We have no certainty that Crossrail
will be built, have we?
Jonathan Stephens: If I may say so, it has always
been clear that Crossrail is not critical to the success
or the transport plans of the Olympics. Mr Higgins
was referring to the work that has been done to
ensure that any proceeding with Crossrail does not
conflict in terms of construction pressures with the
Olympics.
Q72 Mr Curry: In response to Helen Goodman’s
questions about areas outside the south-east of
England, you said how jolly it would be for
everybody to be able to come andwatch theOlympic
games. How important are eVective high-speed rail
links to Yorkshire and Humberside—where I come
from—the north-east and north-west in facilitating
the ability of the whole nation to participate in this
project?
Jonathan Stephens: If I may say so, the case for those
links does not stand or fall on transporting people
for three or six weeks in 2012. If there is a case to be
made, I am sure that it will be made on the basis of
wider and longer benefits.
Q73 Mr Curry: Finally, presumably what will
happen during the Olympic games is what happens
during Wimbledon: large numbers of people will
rent out their houses for the period of the games to
make a handsome bob or two. Is that regarded as a
taxable activity? Do the Government have plans to
check who is renting out houses and ensure that they
pay their share?
Jonathan Stephens: I am sure Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs will consider that and, if
appropriate, will take action.
Chairman: Good. That is very useful information,
thank you.
Q74 Mr Touhig: I shall concentrate my comments
and questions on the structure. Can the Olympic
Board direct the Olympic Delivery Authority and
the London organising committee and tell them
what to do?
Jonathan Stephens: It sets the overall strategy and
delivery objectives for the games and has to approve
the ODA budget and its master plan.
Q75 Mr Touhig: But can it tell them what to do?
David Higgins: I think it is more accurate to say that
it operates an approval mechanism. The board can
tell us what we cannot do—for example, it could
reject our budget. However, it cannot direct us to
spend money because we are a non-departmental
public body reporting to the Government. The
Government can reject our plans, but cannot direct
what we do.
Q76 Mr Touhig: Following on from what the
Chairman said at the beginning, there is no one
person with overall responsibility. Is that in
anticipation of failure or is it an insurance policy so
that no one will have to carry the can?
Jonathan Stephens: One of the lessons learned from
previous games is that it is fundamentally critical to
get the inevitable tripartite relationship between the
Olympic movement, the host city and the host
nation at the heart of any games right. That is
essentially what the structure that has been put in
place has been designed to do, while also providing
clear and accountable delivery mechanisms
Mr Higgins and the ODA are clearly accountable
and responsible for the delivery of the construction,
infrastructure and the venues, and the London
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games is
responsible for running the games.
Q77 Mr Touhig: I am hugely impressed that you
can say that without smiling and that you kept a
straight face.
The three stakeholders are the Government, the
Mayor and the British Olympic Association. Below
that we have the Olympic Board, which is
responsible for oversight.We than have the Olympic
Delivery Authority, which is responsible for venues
and infrastructure and has a budget of £3 billion,
and LOCOG—the London Olympic committee—
which is responsible for running the games. Looking
at those two bodies and their relationship to the
Olympic Board, you say that the board cannot direct
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those bodies to spendmoney, but can approve or not
approve budgets. That seems very complex because
the Olympic Board is also supported by the Olympic
programme support unit and the Olympic Board
steering group. What do those two groups do?
Jonathan Stephens: The Olympic programme
support unit is a small group that independently
monitors progress against the Olympic programme
as a whole adopted by the Olympic Board and set
out in one of the appendices to the NAO Report.
The Olympic Board steering group simply brings
together oYcials at a level below the Olympic Board
to ensure that decisions are well prepared and
processed.
Q78 Mr Touhig: In Wales the oYcial definition of a
deprived person is someone who does not have a
meeting to attend—you certainly have some Welsh
blood in you. The Government Olympic Executive
of the DCMS manages cross-Government interests.
Who does it answer to? Is it to the board?
Jonathan Stephens: It answers to me and is headed
up by Mr Jacobs.
Q79 Mr Touhig: Do you answer to the board for
what that body does?
Jonathan Stephens: No. Essentially that body plays
the role of client within the Government and
supports the Secretary of State in her role and with
her responsibilities on theOlympic Board and across
Government.
Q80 Mr Touhig:Then we have the delivery partners
and the Olympic project review group of the DCMS
What does the Olympic project review group do?
Jonathan Stephens: It approves projects over and
above £20million, brings together the keyWhitehall
Departments, including the Treasury, and processes
critical project approvals within three weeks or so.
Q81 Mr Touhig: You do not think that that is an
over-complex structure?
Jonathan Stephens: As Mr Higgins has said, the
project is one of the single biggest projects being
delivered in the UK. It involves a fundamental,
tripartite relationship at its heart.
Q82 Mr Touhig: But you already have a tripartite
relationship. You have the three stakeholders—the
Government, the Mayor and the British Olympic
Authority—so why do you need such complex
structure below it? Surely the Olympic Board ought
to be in total control—directing, authorising and
giving instructions on the operation of the project.
Jonathan Stephens: If I may, I shall answer and then
I shall bring in the others. The Olympic Board exists
to set strategic oversight—it reviews the ODA
budget and the large projects. The Olympic project
review group exists to ensure that other projects are
processed speedily and smoothly, because—on the
experience of previous games—one of the key risks
is delay in decision making.
Q83 Mr Touhig: Are you seriously suggesting that
that structure will facilitate speedy and rapid
decision making?
Jonathan Stephens: It think it is—
Mr Touhig:Without smiling.
Jonathan Stephens: It is appropriate for the purpose
in mind. Fundamentally, there are only two new
bodies: the purpose-built ODA and the organising
committee. The rest exist to ensure that the structure
works smoothly.
David Higgins: Another reason is that there are two
lots of shareholders. The ODA has the Government
as a shareholder, and LOCOG has a combination of
shareholders whereby profits go back into sport,
which is why it has to be kept separate. It is an IOC
requirement that the bodies are kept separate. There
will always be two separate bodies: one that stages
the games and one that builds the facilities—the
Government delivery arm.
Q84 Mr Touhig: You know the story of the Tower
of Babel. The ancients thought that they could build
a tower to heaven, but they could not understand
each other. The structure is a framework for such a
fiasco, is it not?
JeV Jacobs: No, I do not think it is. It is an IOC
requirement that there should be an organising
committee, as there was for Athens and for Sydney,
and the London organising committee is a result
of that requirement. Furthermore, the organising
committee is not enabled to spend capital, so as a
simple matter of fact we could not have used it as a
delivery organisation for venues and infrastructure.
Q85 Mr Touhig: I appreciate what it was that the
IOC required, but you have created a very complex
structure. You are the accounting oYcer at the
DCMS, Mr Stephens. Are you happy with the
structure? Do you have a role as Accounting OYcer
in the project?
Jonathan Stephens: Absolutely, no—
Q86 Mr Touhig: What does that mean—that you
are absolutely not the Accounting OYcer?
Jonathan Stephens: As I confirmed earlier, Mr
Higgins and the Chief Executive of LOCOG both
report to me as additional accounting oYcers. It is
the top priority of the DCMS to deliver the project
on time and in budget, and it is my personal top
priority. One has to consider the record of decision
making over the past 12 to 18 months, which is that
the master plan has been revised and now finalised,
in the course of which £600 million in costs was
avoided; the design of the aquatic centre was
considered by the Olympic Board and was sent back
for redesign to improve its legacy use and take out
extra cost, and we are going through a similar
process with the main stadium; and the Olympic
Board has approved one of the single largest
planning applications ever made and a draft
transport plan that was issued six years in advance
of the games.
Q87 Mr Touhig: I have very little time. Could you
keep your answers quite short?
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Jonathan Stephens: Other than the ODA and the
LOCOG, these groups are essentially meetings
rather than new bodies.
Q88 Mr Touhig: But you seem to be emphasising
that there will be revisions and reviews, and the
structure means that, as you get deeper into the
project, things will become more diYcult. In your
response to my colleague, Mrs Goodman, you
talked about private sector involvement and you
used the term lend-lease. You will be aware that we
had that between 1939 and 1945, and 60 years later
we have just started to pay it oV.
Jonathan Stephens:LendLease is, of course, a public
company. There has just been an announcement that
it will be the exclusive contractor to deliver the
Village, which, I repeat, will largely be funded by the
private sector.
Q89 Mr Touhig:You spoke earlier about the role of
the Olympic Board, but the Report makes it clear
that the four members of the Board want to work by
consensus, and that each of them will have a right to
veto decisions aVecting their responsibilities. That
cannot make sense, can it?
Jonathan Stephens: The memorandum sets out the
various consent rights.What is fundamental and has
been learned from the lessons of every previous
event is that getting the relationship right between
the key stakeholders—the city, the Government and
the Olympics movement—is critical. The Olympic
Board brings all of those together, and, as I said, the
members are working together eVectively to deliver
real decisions on the ground.
Q90 Mr Touhig: You defend the structure, but can
you say with hand on heart that you think that this
is the best structure to deliver the games successfully,
given what happened in Sydney and other places?
The games will impact on our international
reputation. We are not talking about a failure of the
dome but Britain’s international reputation falling
apart.
Jonathan Stephens: Indeed. In drawing up the
structure, we specifically sought to apply the lessons
from previous games. Critically, the split between
LOCOG and the ODA is based on a lesson from the
dome, which was brought out by this Committee in
previous Reports and which we have sought to
follow.
Q91 Mr Touhig: But you confidently defend this
structure as the best way to deliver the games.
Jonathan Stephens: I believe that it is appropriate for
delivering the games. One of the other lessons from
previous games is that, as the games go through their
diVerent phases, one needs to be flexible and ready
to adjust structures and relationships.
Q92 Mr Touhig: But you have so many people
involved, and they have great responsibility if things
go wrong.
Jonathan Stephens: One of the successes of the
past year was getting those critical bodies up and
running, getting professional management and
staff with strong capabilities, and getting the
relationships within the Olympic Board working
eVectively to deliver real decisions.
Q93 Mr Touhig: In 1812, after he retreated from
Moscow, Napoleon reflected that from the sublime
to the ridiculous is one small step. Youmight care to
read some of the writings on the Russian campaign,
which ended in tears. Let us hope that, with your
structure, the Olympic games do not.
Chairman: And remember 1512, too—I mean 1520.
Jonathan Stephens: It seems to be 12s.
Q94 Chairman: Yes. You are not seriously saying
that the structure for the games is less complex than
the one for the Millennium Dome, are you?
Jonathan Stephens: One of the lessons from
the dome was the fundamental confusion
between building the dome as an object—the
infrastructure—which was actually quite successful,
and staging the event, around which there were lots
of diVerent ideas. Splitting the responsibilities,
which are fundamentally diVerent andwhich require
diVerent sorts of skills and emphases, was one of the
key lessons.
Chairman: Thank you.
Q95 Annette Brooke: When members of the
International Olympic Committee came recently—
last week, I suppose—with whom did they meet?
Jonathan Stephens: Their relationship is directly
with the organising committee, of which Lord Coe is
the chairman, but they also met with other people,
including Mr Higgins, who is responsible for
delivering key parts of the games, and, of course, the
Secretary of State.
Q96 Annette Brooke: The press reports suggest that
they were fairly happy with their meeting with the
organising committee. Was that the case? The press
reports also indicate that they definitively want a
proper budget by June at the latest. Is that the case?
Jonathan Stephens:Thatwas not in the communique´
that I saw, which spoke of recognising that there had
been thorough work and progress since their last
visit. The IOC also said that it was given a briefing
on the processes bywhich the wider budget would be
determined.
Q97 Annette Brooke: It will come again in June,
though. Is that correct?
Jonathan Stephens: Every six months.
Q98 Annette Brooke: Every six months. So one
would anticipate that it will expect some answers
by then.
Jonathan Stephens: We would very much hope that
the budget is resolved quickly.
Q99 Annette Brooke:Let us suppose that in the next
few weeks you sort the budget out and it comes to
£10 billion. Let us further suppose that it rises over
the next few years to £15 billion or £20 billion.
Whose responsibility would that be if it occurred
after you had determined this budget?
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Jonathan Stephens: I do not remotely recognise
any of those figures. They must inevitably be
speculation.
Q100 Annette Brooke: I am just making a logical
progression. We started with £2.2 billion. There
are now press reports around the £8 billion to
£10 billion mark. Whatever is the agreed figure and
whenever we are told the definitive figure, should
over the next few years we depart by perhaps
£1.5 billion or double that figure, whose
responsibility would it be? Like Mr Touhig, I am
pretty confused by the chart. Where would the
buck stop?
Jonathan Stephens: I just want to make it clear that
I do not recognise any of those figures. They must
just be speculation. TheOlympicDeliveryAuthority
is responsible for construction and infrastructure,
which make up the bulk of the costs that we are
talking about. It is responsible for sticking to that
budget and will be held responsible for it.
Q101 Annette Brooke: So the buck stops with you,
Mr Higgins.
David Higgins: On everything that relates to the
Olympic Delivery Authority, not LOCOG.
Jonathan Stephens: That is the staging of the games.
David Higgins: There are two organisations: one
putting on the show.
Q102 Annette Brooke: I understand that, but
LOCOG has set out its budget, has it not? So we are
talking about the other part of the budget. That
stops with you.We knowwhomwe need to question
in future.
I am also concerned about the complexity of the
organisations and the monitoring. A complex chart
has been set out on page 22, I think. Let us suppose
that someone in all the complexity misses a deadline,
such as a certain site not being ready on time.
How would that be remedied? Who would take
responsibility for it?
David Higgins: Ultimately, we have clear
accountability for delivering venues and
infrastructure in time for the games. We want to
deliver them well in advance of the games so that
LOCOG, the organising committee, has time to test
events and to induct and train volunteers and staV
involved in the games. We hope to finish 12
months out.
Q103 Annette Brooke: Supposing that you miss a
deadline and that stops LOCOG doing what it
should do. How is the structure worked out so that
it is all right on the night?
David Higgins:We do regular reports. I am going to
the Olympics Board tomorrow. It go to its steering
committee each month and Report progress, so the
Department and the Olympic Board are well aware
of all progress. I can tell you now that we will miss
certain deadlines; it is just a reality of major
construction progress. If wemiss a deadline, we shall
re-programme.
Q104 Annette Brooke: I want to know how it will be
addressed.
David Higgins:We will re-programme it and look at
how to make up time in other areas so that we still
hit the deadline for LOCOG to have plenty of time
for test events.
Jonathan Stephens: I should make it clear that the
ODA and LOCOG, while separate organisations,
are co-located. The staV talk to each other hourly
and daily.
Q105 Annette Brooke: I want to ask a question
slightly outside the present structure. You said
about all the games being located in London, but I
come from Dorset and understand that the sailing
will take place from Portland. Given what is
supposed to happen down there, like a road being
completed but not yet having received planning
permission, and the fact that Natural England does
not like it verymuch, how are those problems picked
up at central Government level and addressed?
David Higgins: We are accountable for everything
that happens at Portland. We are working with the
Regional Development Agency down there to make
it happen. We are not accountable for the road; that
is the Highways Agency and the Department for
Transport. We are working with a private developer
on everything about the marina development to
ensure not only that we deliver for the Olympic
games, but that legacy-wise a substantial marina will
be developed for Portland in the long term.
Q106 Annette Brooke: I wanted to end on legacy. It
is important to everybody and to us locally. The
legacy will be particularly diYcult to achieve
without the road because people will not be staying
and hotels will not be built unless people have
confidence. That is for the Highways Agency, but
can you assure me that the problems there are being
fed into the centre pattern somewhere?
DavidHiggins:Weare obviously supportive, and the
Department for Transport has approved the scheme
in principle. It is a matter of getting the necessary
approvals to deliver it. The plan is to deliver the
sailing facilities well in advance—in fact up to two
years in advance of the games, to allow as many as
possible of the sailing squads that finish in Beijing to
relocate to Portland, to give plenty of time for
training and, hopefully, bring plenty of economic
development into the region.
Q107 Annette Brooke: There are not any local
worries about that side of it, I think.
If I could just come to the legacy from the London
side, in paragraph 85 on page 21, for example, the
document says: “Key questions to be resolved are
who will own the individual venues after the
Games”. There are a lot of other questions. While
you may be more concerned about the budget at the
moment, are not such things important to establish
early on; and can you tell me what progress you are
making with those questions?
David Higgins:Yes, it is very important to get those
established now. Lee Valley park trust owns a large
part of the land that the Olympic sites will be built
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on, so the canoeing facilities in Broxbourne, the
Eton Manor facilities and what will eventually
become tennis and hockey facilities, and the
velopark and cycling facilities will all be owned—the
physical land will be owned—by Lee Valley park
trust. We work closely with the trust and with the
British cycling and canoeing organisations to make
sure that what is built will satisfy them as well as the
local boroughs and the authorities that we are
working with there. As for the main venues in the
park, which are the stadium and the aquatic centre,
significant work is under way now to ensure that,
while we have not finalised the end-ownership
structure—the trust that will inevitably be put in
place to own those assets and remain in public
ownership—the long-term operating costs of those
venues will be minimised. We are also working to
bring revenue streams in to ensure that we do not
create a white elephant in either of those assets.
Annette Brooke: Thank you.
Q108 Mr Dunne: A number of Members of the
Committee have sought to look at lessons that have
been learned from past projects and have taken us
back in time and history. Which individual, from
which country, do you regard as the person who was
the inspiration of themodernOlympicmovement? It
is a history question.
Jonathan Stephens: Baron Pierre de Coubertin.
Q109 MrDunne:Am I right in thinking that you are
the Permanent Secretary of one of the major UK
Government Departments?
Jonathan Stephens: Yes.
Q110 Mr Dunne: Have you ever heard of Dr
William Penny Brookes?
Jonathan Stephens: No.
Q111 Mr Dunne: May I suggest as an important
first step after this meeting that you look him up on
a website? Dr Penny Brookes was the inspiration for
Baron de Coubertin. Dr Penny Brookes was the
leading citizen of Much Wenlock in the mid-19th
Century. Much Wenlock has held the Wenlock
Olympian games every year apart from during
the second world war since 1850, and it is my
determination that not just you but every other
British citizen and frankly every citizen of the world
who has an interest in the Olympics will be aware
that it was Britain that was the inspiration. It was
this country, not France, to refer back to the field of
the cloth of gold. I am disappointed, to say the least,
that that has not yet sunk in at the Department
responsible for delivering London 2012.
Chairman:We want an answer to that.
Jonathan Stephens: Well, I have already got
examples from Napoleon and Henry VIII to follow,
and there is clearly something to learn there. I am
told that Much Wenlock was part of our Olympics
roadshow.
Q112 Mr Dunne: It certainly was part of the
roadshow. I very much hope that in future it will be
part of all your literature to promote London 2012,
because that is where it started. I would like a
commitment from you to look into that and push
it forward.
Jonathan Stephens: I am very happy to give that.
Q113 Mr Dunne: I am very grateful to you. Thank
you, Chairman, for letting me get that oV my chest.
Much Wenlock, for those Members of the
Committee who are not aware of it, is in the Ludlow
constituency.
To go back to the subject of the Committee, in
paragraph 3 the NAO Report refers to the
Government underwriting the costs.What figure did
the Government have in mind when they gave an
underwriting commitment for the games?
Jonathan Stephens:At the time of the bid document,
they had set out the public sector funding package of
£2.4 billion. They had also set out in the bid
document, in recognition of the wider infrastructure
development and regeneration, that further public
and private sector funding would be necessary.
Q114 Mr Dunne: Does that mean that the
Government acknowledge and have made a
commitment to the International Olympic
Committee that all those costs ultimately will be
borne by the Government if nobody else fulfils their
element of the package?
Jonathan Stephens: That is the element of the
guarantee that they have to underwrite the costs of
the organising committee in staging the games and
the construction costs in providing for the games.
That of course does not mean that the Government
are not committed to keeping those costs very tightly
under control and ensuring that the organising
committee does not actually require any public
subsidy.
Q115 Mr Dunne: Indeed, but that would also cover
the so-called non-Olympic costs, because without
the infrastructure that is dependent on Olympic
costs, you would not have a stadium, so ultimately
the undertaking extends to the non-Olympic costs
as well.
Jonathan Stephens: Of course, those costs are the
costs that the Government would be meeting in any
case under their wider regeneration policies.
Q116 Mr Dunne:May I take you to paragraph 51?
In relation to those specific costs, an Exchequer
commitment of £1.044 billion has been made. Only
£405 million has been secured, and the NAOReport
says: “the remainder will be sought as part of
the Government’s 2007 Comprehensive Spending
Review.”Do you have any doubt at all as to whether
the Government will undertake to turn that
indication in principle into a commitment?
Jonathan Stephens: No. That clearly will be turned
into a commitment. Of course, it will be done so in
the course of the normal public spending planning
framework, and the comprehensive spending review
is the first opportunity to do that.
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Q117 Mr Dunne: Am I wrong to interpret the
Report as indicating that the Government have an
open-ended commitment in respect of the games?
Although obviously they have an obligation to keep
the costs under control—to keep a taut budget, to
use your phrase—in practice the Government will
end up picking up the tab, because if they do not they
will be in breach of the obligations in relation to the
International Olympic Committee.
Jonathan Stephens: Well, no. The object,
particularly in respect of the organising committee’s
budget, is to avoid the Government’s picking up any
of the tab. The costs of staging the games—the
£2 billion or so—will be generated from IOC
contribution, global sponsors, local sponsors,
commercial rights and other such opportunities. The
Government have underwritten that, but are aiming
to ensure that there is no public subsidy.
Q118 MrDunne: Is any element of the underwritten
cost on the Government balance sheet at this point?
Is there a figure within which you are working?
Jonathan Stephens: We have given notification, as
we had to do, of a contingent liability in respect of
the guarantees, in respect of the organising
committee, and in respect of the other funding that
is referred to in paragraph 51 and in the public sector
funding package, and the extent of those contingent
liabilities is in the resource accounts.
Q119 MrDunne:Whowas responsible for VAT not
being factored into the original budget for the
games?
Jonathan Stephens: That was a recognised
assumption at the time that was shared and agreed
across the Government. It recognised the fact that it
was not—
Q120 Mr Dunne: Sorry, what was recognised—that
VAT would not be applicable?
Jonathan Stephens: No, that there was an issue
about the tax treatment and that that depended
critically onwhat delivery structure was put in place.
For example if parts of the infrastructure had been
delivered by a local authority or a local authority-
type body, local authorities are exempt from VAT.
Therewas simply a recognition that at the time of the
bid it was impossible to predict what the tax
treatment would be at the time, but I come back to
the point—
Q121 Mr Dunne: What amount was allowed for to
cover VAT in the contingency budget?
Jonathan Stephens: The bid that was submitted to
the IOC is very clear: it excludes VAT because it was
not possible at the time to determine the tax
treatment, because the delivery structure was
uncertain. But I come back to the point that this is
essentially a technical issue in which money is being
transferred from one arm ofGovernment to another
arm of Government.
Q122 Mr Dunne: In the contingency budget, there
was a figure for security. What lessons were learned
and what use was made of the experience of security
at, for example, Sydney—Mr Higgins must have
been familiar with that element of the budget—and
Athens?
Jonathan Stephens: The element that was put in the
bid for security was primarily focused on the cost of
security at the site and in the venues. It was
recognised at the time that it was not possible to
estimate in detail the wider security and policing
costs across London and the country as a whole.
Indeed, at the time my predecessor notified the PAC
of a potential contingent liability arising from the
wider policing and security costs.
Q123 Mr Dunne: Mr Higgins, do you know what
the cost of Athens’ security was?
David Higgins: No, I do not. I was not involved in
Athens at all, but what we did do—
Q124 Mr Dunne: If I may interrupt, as I am afraid
that I am short of time, my understanding was that
it was in the order of ƒ1 billion. Did nobody think
to ask the people who ran Athens or ran Sydney
what the cost of security measures would be?
David Higgins: We have engaged an expert
organisation that came out of Sydney, which has
vetted all the ODA’s security costs. The adjustment
that the Secretary of State announced in
November—the £900 million—included additional
money to cover ODA security costs.
Q125 Mr Dunne: I think that sounds like a no in
answer tomy question.We referred earlier to lessons
learned from the Millennium Dome. Mr Stephens,
have you or any of your senior oYcials discussed
with Lord James the lessons to be learned from the
millennium dome?
Jonathan Stephens: I have not discussed that with
Lord James, but we have learned lessons from the
various reports, including this Committee’s.
Q126 Mr Dunne: Are you aware of Lord James’s
concerns and recommendations, which were aired
widely on the radio earlier this week?
Jonathan Stephens: Indeed. In respect of the
concerns that he expressed about sponsorship, I
have to say that this is a fundamentally diVerent sort
of event. The Olympic games have a long and well
established experience and history of successful
sponsorship—
Q127 Mr Dunne: If I may interrupt you, I was not
concerned about sponsorship. He made some
specific recommendations about the structures used
for delivering on time and on budget without
allowing the individual commissioning entity to run
out of money each period when it was seeking to
draw down funds to complete part of a project. Is
that something that applies in this case and are you
familiar with the issue?
Jonathan Stephens: Indeed, the cash flow
management of the ODA is an important issue and
one that is kept regularly under review to ensure that
it does not run out of money.
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Q128 Mr Dunne: Is it operating within the same
legal framework as the operator of the Millennium
Dome?
Jonathan Stephens: I would have to write to you
about that.2
Q129 Mr Dunne: Could you do so, please, because
Lord James indicated that one of the fundamental
weaknesses of the construction of the Millennium
Dome project was that it had to operate as though
it was insolvent for most of its working life? I hope,
Mr Higgins, that that does not apply to you.
Q130 Mr Wright: Is planning the Olympics rather
like planning a wedding?What I mean by that is that
you phone up a chauVeur firm and say, “I would like
a car, please”; they say, “Certainly sir, that will be
£1,000”; you say, “It is for my daughter’s wedding”;
and they say, “Oh, I’m sorry sir, that will be £3,000.”
Will there be cost creep because it is the Olympics
and so contractors and suppliers, because they know
that it has to be delivered, will up the prices
accordingly?
David Higgins: A project with a fixed, clearly
immovable deadline is always a challenge.
Q131 Mr Wright: So the answer is yes, then?
David Higgins: It is not a wedding, but the benefit of
this is that you plan awedding only a year in advance
and you really want it to happen and so our best
protection for the public purse is to ensure that we
are not held in a position where we do not have
anywhere to go in terms of the negotiations. The
challenge is to plan as much as possible and to bring
forward as many things as we possibly can to avoid
that situation.
Q132 Mr Wright: The NAO is very good in its
Report in saying that there is a relationship and a
tension between time, cost and quality. Clearly, we
have to start this in July 2012, and there is no getting
away from that. The games will be a showcase for
everything that is good about this country and
everything that we want to be. They are the biggest
spectacle on earth and highlight what Britain is good
at, so we cannot compromise on quality. Is the
payback that we do not give a toss, frankly, about
cost?
David Higgins: No. The time is obviously
immovable, but the biggest thing that we can do is to
focus on scope and that is exactly what we did at the
start The first thing we did was to take venues on the
Olympic site—there were two fencing venues, which
we made into one; we took volleyball, which was
supposed to be played in a large temporary venue
built on the park with 10,000 seats, and we moved it
2 Note by witness: No, the builder, developer and operator of
the Millennium Dome, the New Millennium Experience
Company Ltd, was a limited company governed by the
CompaniesActs andwholly owned by theGovernment. The
Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) is a body corporate
established under the London Olympic and Paralympic
Games Act 2006. The functions of the ODA are set out at
Section 4 of the Act. They do not entail the staging of the
Games. This is a separate responsibility of the London
Organising Committee, LOCOG.
to Earls Court where there is a perfectly good
facility; and we moved the media centre. We
changed the scope a lot, and we are still changing the
scope. We changed the scope at the aquatic centre.
If you build less—or rather, if you build for legacy
rather than temporarily for the Olympics—you have
a chance of de-risking the project.
Q133 Mr Wright:What sort of budgetary and cost
control takes place?
DavidHiggins:There is very stringent budgetary and
cost control.
Q134 Mr Wright: But you do not know what the
final budget is?
David Higgins: We give ongoing advice to the
Department. Importantly, we have a cash flow and
a budget approved for this year finishing, while next
year’s budget is going to the Olympic board
tomorrow, with the recommendation that the
Department approve and fully fund it, so that gives
us about 18 months.
Q135 Mr Wright: I am confused, because my
understanding is that there is no final budget
approved yet. What actual spend are you
monitoring against? What sort of budgetary
variance analysis or outturn forecasting takes place?
What goes on?
David Higgins: All of that happens and we have all
been audited by theNAO, so it is our auditor, as well
as having done this study. We also comply with all
OGC requirements, so at every major milestone on
every project OGC will come in and do a study and
report to our independent audit committee on the
satisfactory nature of the controls in place.
Q136 MrWright:Amemorandum was provided to
the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport
in October 2006 by the Olympic Delivery Authority.
Under the headings “Issues onWhich Evidence Has
Been Sought” and “Funding”, it said: “We have
prepared a long-term budget which we are now
discussing with DCMS and Treasury to agree its
appropriateness and how it will be funded. We
believe that the agreement of a realistic and robust
budget will be an important step forward for the
project. We expect to have an outline budget for
2007–08 ready later this year”. Has that been done?
David Higgins: Yes.
Q137 Mr Wright: The memorandum continued:
“and to be able to deliver a first draft of the
Corporate Plan incorporating the lifetime budget
during February 2007.” Has that been done?
David Higgins: Yes.
Q138 Mr Wright: That is good.
May I ask about the £1.044 billion for non-Olympic
infrastructure? The Culture, Media and Sport
Committee’s report is fascinating on that as well and
says in paragraph 18 that “£1.044 billion of public
funding has been set aside for ‘linking the Olympic
Park to local infrastructure’.” However, you were
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hinting in an earlier answer, Mr Higgins, that that
would have been spent anyway, because of the local
regeneration schemes. Is that the case?
David Higgins: It would eventually have been
required. Would that have been done in the same
way or as eYciently? Who knows? Of the £1.044
billion, the first component, the £400 million, was
for the power lines contract, which is well under way
now. Other elements include the 32 bridges that are
required on the site just to link it together. It is
infrastructure that would be required to regenerate
the valley. Would that have happened in the next
five? Unlikely. In the next 10 years? I gave you those
other examples of major regeneration projects.
History shows that they take a lot longer than
people expect.
Q139 MrWright:TheDCMSCommittee observed,
quite disturbingly I thought, that there was no
detailed breakdown of that sum of just over
£1 billion. It noted that: “there remains a lack of
clarity about the expenditure of such a significant
sum, and we recommend that the Government issue
a detailed breakdown of how the figure was reached
and how it is to be spent.” Has that been done yet?
David Higgins: I am not sure. I know that there is a
breakdown—I am certainly aware of it.
Jonathan Stephens: And this is what will feature in
the comprehensive budget, when we will set out the
breakdown of that and other key figures.
Q140 Mr Wright: Could you remind me of when
that will be?
Jonathan Stephens: Soon.
Q141 Mr Wright: Right, we are back to “soon”.
Mr Dunne mentioned paragraph 51 of the NAO
Report and made a good point about the
£1.044 billion, of which £405 million has been
secured. The remainder will be sought as part of the
Government’s 2007 comprehensive spending review.
With the greatest of respect, Mr Stephens, you
seemed very flippant to me when you said that that
would clearly be received. Given tightened financial
pressures on public spending, what is to stop the
Treasury saying, “Well actually, come on, you’ve
had £900 million of extra costs already. You’re not
going to get this”? What sort of contingency plan is
in place? I got the impression that you were quite
complacent in saying, “Well, we’re bound to get this,
aren’t we, because the Treasury wouldn’t want to
jeopardise the Olympics.” Is that sort of flippancy
and complacency an example of cost control in the
whole project?
Jonathan Stephens: Far from it. I am sorry if I
appeared flippant; I was not meaning to be. The
commitment to the Olympics and the extra public
and private sector funding, including the £1 billion,
is a collective commitment by the Government as a
whole, and I am confident that the Government as a
whole will deliver on it.
Q142 Mr Wright: Could you talk a little about the
£400 million that has been provided to secure the
services of the delivery partner? Why was that not
anticipated during the bid or in the early stages of the
programme?
David Higgins: I cannot talk about the bid, but I can
talk about the £400 million, which is for a
combination of things. The delivery partner will
provide services such as programme management,
project management, planning and procurement.
The ODA had to provide those services anyway,
whether in house or via the hire of an expert
organisation. The £400 million also includes IT and
site establishment costs, so it is not only the cost of
the delivery partner. Given the size, scale and
complexity, and that there is a fixed deadline, a
figure of something around 10% of the overall cost
for its management and running is probably
realistic.
Q143 Mr Wright: I do not understand why the
£400million that was necessary in order to secure the
services of a delivery authority was not identified
earlier.
Jonathan Stephens: Perhaps I can answer that
question. The figure was not required for the
purposes of submitting the candidate file to the
International Olympic Committee, but the area of
costs to which you referred was identified as
necessary for inclusion. The first estimate was based
on the benchmark of an urban development
corporation. Subsequent planning and review
recognised that such a benchmark inevitably led to
a serious underestimate. Therefore, given the size,
scale and complexity of the project, it was more
appropriate to recognise that very significant
management and delivery costs would be necessary.
That was reflected in what the Secretary of State said
about increasing—
Q144 Mr Wright: The £400 million is part of what
is already a £900 million overspend. Is it the plan
that the £400 million will generate savings through
rigorous cost control and budgetary planning?
Jonathan Stephens: We believe that rigorous cost
control is absolutely essential to the future of the
project.
Q145 Mr Wright: But do you have a figure for how
much the £400 million will secure in savings—say,
£1.5 billion?
David Higgins: I reinforce the fact that the
£400 million is the essential cost of running the
Olympic games, of running a project of such a size
and scale.
Q146 Mr Wright: You are telling us that the
£400 million is an essential part of running the
Olympic games, and yet it was not considered as part
of the bid or as one of the first aspects of the delivery
programme. I find it unbelievable that the cost was
so important and yet you have only just thought
about it.
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David Higgins: What we are saying is that
£400million for a project of such a size is reasonable.
Whether themoney was identified previously as part
of the project costs or separated out was not part of
the original estimates?. I wasn’t around when the
original estimates were done. The original bid was
based on the costs that a thinly resourced urban
development corporation might incur in managing
such a project, or series of projects.
Q147 Mr Wright: My time is almost up. Finally, I
have a question about security, which you also
discussed with Mr Dunne. Paragraph 46 of the
Culture, Media and Sport Committee report on the
Olympics basically says that security costs have been
underestimated. It also states that the Mayor of
London: “indicated . . . that there might be . . .
£300 million” in “‘opportunity cost’ and ‘maybe
another £250 million’ for measures such as
electronic monitoring.” Mr Dunne, I believe, said
that the costs might be something like £1 billion.
I am a member of the Committee currently
considering the UK Borders Bill, which will tighten
controls. What sort of pan is being put in place to
make the games safe for everyone who goes there,
while maintaining cost control? I do not see any of
that at the moment.
Jonathan Stephens: The matter is under the Olympic
security co-ordinator, who works closely with the
Home OYce and the Metropolitan Police. The
operational plan for wider policing and security at
the games is being drawn up, and the budgetary
implications are being considered. At the time of the
bid, it was recognised that an element of the wider
policing and security costs could not have
realistically been estimated. It was recognised that
to engage in estimates for something that was
fundamentally uncertain, and which related to an
event eight years hence, would not be a good use of
scarce operational police resources. The planning
work is now happening and will result soon, perhaps
later this year, in a clear plan and a budget to go
with it.
Chairman: There are 2 more questions, from
Richard Bacon, and then Ian Davidson.
Q148 Mr Bacon: Mr Jacobs, you are the Chief
Executive of the Government Olympic Executive. It
says in the Report, under paragraph d on page 6,
that the role of the Government Olympic Executive
will be to: “exercise eVective oversight” of Mr
Higgins’ authority. However, it says elsewhere in the
Report that you are no longer the Accounting
OYcer. Is that right?
Jonathan Stephens: Perhaps I can answer that.
Q149 Mr Bacon: No. Mr Jacobs has not said a
single word yet, so if you do not mind Mr Stephens,
I should like him to answer some questions.
Jonathan Stephens: He has made a very significant
contribution.
Q150 Mr Bacon: Mr Stephens, if you wouldn’t
mind, my question was directed to Mr Jacobs. I
would like Mr Jacobs to answer my question. If I
direct a question to you, I would like you to answer,
if that is possible, please.
Jonathan Stephens: If I may, I am answering this
question because this was my decision, so I should
answer it.
Q151 Mr Bacon:Hang on,Mr Stephens.Whether it
is your decision or not does not alter the fact that I
asked Mr Jacobs the question. I did not ask you the
question. Mr Jacobs has not said anything yet. We
have been here since 4.30 pm—one hour and 35
minutes—andMr Jacobs has yet to speak. You have
spoken a lot; I think it is Mr Jacobs’ turn, if you
don’t mind.
Q152 Chairman: Why don’t you both speak? Mr
Jacobs, have a go, go on.
JeV Jacobs: I did say something before, actually.
Mr Bacon: I am sorry I missed it.
Chairman: It was very interesting.
Jonathan Stephens: Let me speak first and then
Mr Jacobs will comment.
Chairman: Just get on with it.
Jonathan Stephens: The Government Olympic
Executive has played an absolutely critical role in the
start-up of these games. It successfully established
the two key delivery bodies—the ODA and
LOCOG. It identified the critical projects to be got
under way early before the delivery structures were
in place, including the power lines; it initiated the
cost review; it has contributed significantly to
controlling costs on the aquatic centre and the main
stadium; it has got the Olympic project review
group, which controls and secures key projects, up
and running. Now it is moving from that critical
start-up, establishing-key-relationships phase to a
phase that is concentrating on delivery. As was
announced earlier, part of moving into that phase is
securing new capabilities for the Government
Olympic Executive that are focused on commercial
experience of big projects.
Q153 Mr Bacon: This is the new Director General
and Financial Director. Is that one person or two?
Jonathan Stephens: That is two posts that we have
advertised.
Q154 Mr Bacon: They have not been filled yet.
Jonathan Stephens: No, they are currently open to
advert.
Q155 Mr Bacon:When will they be filled?
Jonathan Stephens:Weare due to interview later this
month and I hope appointments—
Q156 Mr Bacon: Have you advertised already?
Jonathan Stephens: Yes.
Q157 Mr Bacon: How long has that process taken?
Chairman:Do youwantMr Jacobs to say something
after all that?
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Q158 Mr Bacon: I would like Mr Jacobs to say
something. My question to him is, why are you no
longer the Accounting OYcer?
JeV Jacobs: Because the decisions to which Mr
Stephens has just referred mean that there will be a
slightly diVerent structure from the current
arrangements. The Accounting OYcer
arrangements will be unified in a single Permanent
Secretary, and under these new arrangements more
attention will be focused on bringing in private
sector expertise to the centre of the Government
Olympic Executive to look over the construction
project. That is not the sort of job that I have been
doing; I have been doing everything that Jonathan
Stephens has referred to. It is time to move on to a
diVerent set of skills.
Mr Bacon: In the civil service—
Jonathan Stephens: He has made a significant
contribution to establishing the start-up.
Q159 Mr Bacon: I did not say that he had not but I
am quite time-limited, so if you wouldn’t mind,
Mr Stephens. It is common in the civil service to plan
people’s careers and how long they spend in
particular posts. Is it planned that you will be here,
in the present post you have with the Government
Olympic Executive, until the Olympics in 2012?
JeV Jacobs: No.
Q160 Mr Bacon:Was it planned?
JeV Jacobs: No.
Q161 Mr Bacon: So how much longer will you be
with the Government Olympic Executive?
Jonathan Stephens: The normal assumption in civil
service careers at this level is a posting of four years.
Q162 Mr Bacon: So how long have you been with
the Government Olympic Executive so far?
JeV Jacobs: A couple of years.
Q163 Mr Bacon: So you have two years to go?
JeV Jacobs:No, I will be moving on when these new
appointments are made.
Q164 Mr Bacon: Oh, I see. So as soon as there is a
Director General and a Finance Director in place
you will be moving on at some point, probably later
this year once the appointments have bedded down?
JeV Jacobs: Yes.
Q165 Mr Bacon: I will ask Mr Higgins a question.
Your CV makes no mention of the Olympic games,
although you mentioned that you had a role in the
Olympic games. What was your role?
David Higgins: I was Chief Executive of the
company that delivered the village and the aquatics
centre in Sydney and the athletics tracks.
Q166 Mr Bacon: Is it your plan to be chief executive
of the Olympic Delivery Authority until the
Olympics are finished in 2012?
David Higgins: Hopefully.
Q167 Mr Bacon: Right. Mr Stephens, will you be,
or has the civil service planned that you will be,
Permanent Secretary of theDepartment for Culture,
Media and Sport until the Olympics in 2012?
Jonathan Stephens: I very much want to be.
Q168 Mr Bacon: So you will be there for slightly
longer than the normal four years?
Jonathan Stephens: I would be delighted.
Q169 Mr Bacon: The resource accounts contingent
liability that you referred to—how much is it?
Jonathan Stephens:Wenotified a contingent liability
around the public sector funding package and the
additional £1 billion referred to in paragraph 51. At
the time of the bid, we also—
Q170 Mr Bacon: £1 million?
Jonathan Stephens: £1 billion—the amount referred
to in paragraph 51. At the time, we also notified the
PAC of potential wider contingent liabilities,
particularly respecting wider policing and security
issues.
Q171 Mr Bacon: How much?
Jonathan Stephens:We did not put a sum on it at the
time, explaining that it was not possible at that stage
to do so.
Q172 Mr Bacon: Paragraph 38 on page 12 refers to
the fact that there is now anOlympic projects review
group, which exists “to assess whether significant
projects can be recommended to the Secretary of
State . . . and the Mayor of London for financial
approval. The review group aims to make
recommendations within two weeks.” Has that
happened?
Jonathan Stephens: The review group is up and
running.
Q173 Mr Bacon: That was not my question. I know
that the review group is up and running. It says that
the review group aims to make recommendations
within two weeks. Has it now done so?
Jonathan Stephens: Yes. It has approved a number
of significant projects.
Q174 Mr Bacon: Could you send us a memo with
the recommendations that it has made so far?
Jonathan Stephens: Certainly.3
Q175 Mr Bacon: Great. Has all the land been
acquired now?
Jonathan Stephens: Yes, 93% of it.
Q176 Mr Bacon: That was the figure that I came
across. What is the diYculty with the remaining
land?
David Higgins: It is subject to the statutory process
of the compulsory purchase order. The period was
completed on 2 February, and there is a chance for
3 Ev 23–24
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people to challenge it. A number of parties have
challenged it. It will go through a proper statutory
review process such that by July 2007, we hope to
have full title to the remaining land.
Q177 Mr Bacon: On the £738 million in putative
private sector funding, figure 6 on page 16 says that
“in the light of advice following the bid, the
Department concluded there was little prospect of
securing significant private sector funding”. Where
did the Department originally think that that
£738 million would come from? Obviously from the
private sector, but from where and for what?
Jonathan Stephens: That is of course one part of the
significant private sector contribution, which will
still be realised—
Q178 Mr Bacon: I am talking about the £738
million, not about the other parts.
Jonathan Stephens: At the time, the Government
were aggressively pursuing private sector funding
for the Olympic games, as was right. The areas
being looked at were contributions to transport,
regeneration and the international broadcast centre,
in addition to the village, on which very substantial
progress has already been made. Also, of course,
there was the prospect of income from ultimate
disposals.
Q179 MrBacon:That £738million figure was based
on advice, was it?
Jonathan Stephens: Yes indeed.
Q180 Mr Bacon:But in light of advice following the
bid, you concluded that there was little prospect of
securing it.
Jonathan Stephens: Yes.
Q181 Mr Bacon:What changed?
Jonathan Stephens: At the time of the bid, as I said,
we were aggressively pursuing the options for
private sector funding. In light of further work after
the bid and further advice, it seemed incompatible to
achieve funding with the sort of time scale that was
going to be necessary. There were still possibilities to
pursue not funding but private sector finance, but on
further examination, they also proved incompatible
with the time scales necessary. It was impossible to
ensure that the time necessary for agreement of
contracts could be factored into the tight time scale
for delivery of the Olympics. I should, however,
make it clear that commercial negotiations are still
going on around that area and the prospect of some
commercial funding, excluding the village, of course,
where the overwhelming bulk of funding will come
from the private sector.
Q182 Mr Bacon: Regarding the £2.375 billion—
that was the public sector funding package—
in evidence to the DCMS Committee, it was
stated that that figure was signed oV by
PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Jonathan Stephens: Yes, indeed. That was based on
the specimen gains originally developed in the Arup
report, which were then examined, including having
the risks assessed, in further work by PwC.
Q183 Mr Bacon: Why did the PwC report—I have
a copy of it here—say £2.749 billion?
Jonathan Stephens: I am not entirely sure which
PwC Report you are referring to?
Q184 Mr Bacon: Olympics and Lower Lea Valley
costing validation review: final report.
Jonathan Stephens:That was produced in 2004, after
the public sector funding package was announced in
2003. There was an earlier PwC report.
Q185 Mr Bacon: Was this figure of £2.375 billion
based on the earlier report, or on this one?
Jonathan Stephens: On the earlier one, because, of
course, that one had not been produced at that time.
Q186 Mr Bacon: So this report is more recent?
Jonathan Stephens: That report informed the bid
document.
Q187 Mr Bacon: But £2.375 billion is the public
figure that you have been going with, and this report
says £2.7 billion.
Jonathan Stephens: That was announced in 2003,
before the bid was submitted, based on the earlier
Arup report.
Q188 Mr Bacon: But you have stuck with that
number?
Jonathan Stephens: Supplemented with the
additional funding set out in paragraph 51; the bid
document made it clear that additional public and
private sector contributions were necessary.
David Higgins: The other diVerence between those
two numbers is the LOCOG contribution to the
venues, which is additional to the £2.375 billion,
making up the vast majority of that diVerence.
Q189 Mr Bacon: I have three more questions: one
about the contingency; one about the VAT; and one
about the consulting firm that you have hired.
In the DCMS Committee report, it says of the VAT
that “One estimate of the total payable is £250
million, although higher figures have been
suggested.” I have no idea whether that is accurate
or not, but perhaps you do. Is that in the ball park,
and if so, what proportion of the total is the VAT
payable on?
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Jonathan Stephens: I will need to write to you with
that information.4
Q190 Mr Bacon: Okay. In relation to the
contingency, there is this question of, on the one
hand, project contingency for individual projects
and then an overall, overarching programme
contingency on top. The DCMS Committee said of
that: “The Committee questions the rationale for
allowing for programme contingency on top of
project contingency, especially at a percentage as
high as that proposed in Treasury guidance. We find
it diYcult to see how a programme contingency of
any substance, rather than simply being prudent,
does not run the risk in itself of escalating the costs.
We note that programme contingency was not
included in advice to those responsible for co-
ordinating the bid but that there is now an informed
consensus that it should be included.” Why is
that? Why should it be there on top of project
contingency?Whywas it not included before the bid,
and why was it included afterwards?
Jonathan Stephens: It recognises that there are
certain risks that exist at the level of the programme
as a whole. To give an example, if the power lines
project, which is under way now and is being
successfully managed to time and budget, were not
being successfully managed and were significantly
delayed, that would impact on all the subsequent
work on the park, on the venues, and all of that.
That would not necessarily be a project risk, in that
nothing would have gone wrong with the delivery of
the main stadium, but it is a risk that exists at the
level of the programme as a whole.
Q191 Mr Bacon: Perhaps you can write to us with
more detail about that, because I am running out of
time and do not want to try the Chairman’s
patience.5
I have just one more question, which is about the
consultants, CLM consortium. The DCMS
Committee report states that: “The ODA”—that is
your organisation— “concluded that further
expenditure was needed ‘to provide the level and
quantity of expertise and skill necessary to deliver . . .
the project . . . and to undertake eVective project and
programme management and cost control’”. A
further £400 million is therefore being invested “in
4 Note by witness: VAT is estimated at 17.5% on relevant
expenditure. There is no exemption from VAT. The only
question was whether the ODA would be given VAT
recovery status under S33 of the VAT Act 1994, or whether
the VAT cost would be funded directly. The Government
has decided on the latter approach. On 15 March 2007 the
Secretary of State announced a provision to the ODA
of around £840 million to enable it to cover its VAT.
The Secretary of State also announced an unallocated
programme contingency including provision for the further
VAT that might arise in the event that any of this
unallocated programme contingency had to be spent.
5 Note by witness: As I explained to the Committee there are
certain risks that exist at the level of the programme as a
whole. The risks surrounding the project were thoroughly
re-assessed as part of the major cost review that we have
undertaken and the risks have been further tested by the
Delivery Partner. The upshot is a clear view there is a need
for a programme contingency to manage the programme
risks. Access to this contingency will be strictly managed.
order to secure the services of the delivery partner.”
First, was it not understood at the outset that
eVective project and programme management and
cost control were necessary? Furthermore, was this
£400 million part of the original cost estimate, or is
it an addition to the original cost estimate?
David Higgins: This is clearly an addition to the
original cost estimate.
Q192 Mr Bacon: So it was not understood at the
outset that therewould be a need for eVective project
and programme management and cost control?
David Higgins: I am sure that it was. However, this
is an estimate that looks at the overall project and
added not only the cost of the delivery partner—as
I said earlier, that could be an in-house cost that we
would have to allow for—but the IT systems
necessary and other issues, including on-site
logistics.
Q193 Mr Bacon:But these things were not included
in the original cost estimate?
David Higgins: We went through our review and
gave ongoing advice to the Secretary of State,
prior to her November statements to the Select
Committee, in which she stated that an additional
£400 million was necessary to manage the site
eVectively.
Q194 Mr Bacon: Do you not think that for
something so key to be missed is extraordinary?
David Higgins: I know the background to the
£400 million and what makes it up. I think that it is
a realistic additional figure.
Q195 Mr Bacon: I am sure that it is all good,
common sense stuV, but I just find it extraordinary
that it was not there to start with. Could you send us
a detailed note on the £400 million and what makes
it up?
David Higgins: Yes.6
Q196 Mr Davidson: I presume that Mr Stephens
and Mr Higgins realise that if the Olympics are a
great success, you will be trampled in the rush, and
if not, Mr Stephens will be lucky to be the second
secretary in Ulan Bator—that being the foreign
equivalent of Ludlow as I understand it.
I want to ask about the wider benefits. Paragraph 91
reads: “the aim was to have the delivery plans in
place by the end of 2006.” Was that done?
JeV Jacobs: The delivery plans are in the process—
Q197 Mr Davidson: That is a no then?
JeV Jacobs: They have been drafted and must be
seen by a Cabinet Committee.
Q198 Mr Davidson: That is a no then. What stage
have we reached on risk area 5, on page 22,
particularly regarding paragraph (e) and the
decision about what benefits will be counted as
positive legacies? If we are going to assess the
6 Ev 24
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positive legacies, but are not certain what will be
counted as a positive legacy, it does not inspire
confidence that this will be done properly.
JeV Jacobs: Appendix 5—I think—carries a fully-
explained set of programme objectives that the
Olympic Board has agreed. They divide up into a
range of individual elements including national and
London benefits.
Q199 Mr Davidson: None of those are quantified
are they?
JeV Jacobs: No, they are not. That is absolutely
right. We are in the process of elaborating on the
delivery plans that you referred to earlier and want
to develop the milestones and outputs identified.
Q200 Mr Davidson:When can we anticipate having
those milestones?
JeV Jacobs:Wewill get them after the delivery plans.
Q201 Mr Davidson: When do you expect the
delivery plans?
JeV Jacobs: I have said that, all being well, they will
go to theCabinet Committee very soon. Thenwe can
move on.
Q202 Mr Davidson: Is very soon better than soon?
JeV Jacobs: It is as soon as Ministers can meet and
hold discussions.
Q203 MrDavidson: Sowill we have itemised targets
for each of the areas covered in appendix 5 within
three months?
JeV Jacobs: What we will seek to do—
Q204 Mr Davidson: Just give me a yes or a no.
JeV Jacobs: It is not a straightforward answer, I am
afraid. Two broad sets of activity are going on:
Government-led delivery planning work, to which I
have referred, and an extensive amount of work
going on in nations and regions groups. We are
seeking to bring those two sets of plans to finality
and to identify the outputs. Thenwewill have a basis
on which to make measurements.
Q205 MrDavidson: I understand all of that. I asked
about the timing.
JeV Jacobs: Very soon I hope—within a matter of
months.
Q206MrDavidson:To return tomy earlier question,
is that within three months?
JeV Jacobs: I do not know the answer to that.
Q207 Mr Davidson: Can I clarify whether anything
will be done to sort out what the costs of the
regeneration would have been had we not taken
the Olympic route? I understand the point about the
Olympics being a catalyst and that some of this
might not have happened otherwise. Presumably,
however, additional costs will be involved in
regeneration as a result of adaptations and re-
adaptations for the Olympics specifically. Will that
be itemised in a way that makes it comprehensible?
Jonathan Stephens: There are procedures in place to
ensure that a distinction is made between Olympic
infrastructure and non-Olympic infrastructure.
That underpins the distinction made in the NAO
Report.
Q208 Mr Davidson: I understand that, but some
of the Olympic infrastructure will subsequently
become non-Olympic, and having gone down the
Olympic route will have increased costs. Will there
be a means by which to identify what the costs were
of having the infrastructure utilised for the
Olympics?
DavidHiggins: In 2004, a funders’ forum established
that split and looked at the issues that you are
talking about. For work that was carried out on
roads or bridges, a percentage was allocated to the
Olympic budget and a percentage was allocated to
the regeneration budget. That applied to every
element. For power lines, for example, 100%. was
allocated to the regeneration budget; for things that
related purely to security for the Olympics, 100%
was allocated to the Olympic budget. That
allocation was made in 2004.
Q209 Mr Davidson: That is helpful. In terms of the
statistics for the five boroughs—I think you
mentioned this point, Mr Higgins—how do we
know that like will be comparedwith like? One ofmy
anxieties is that when regeneration takes place, the
poor people are often moved somewhere else. Am I
right in thinking that house price inflation in the
Olympic area and the surrounding area has been far
higher than that in the rest of London and the UK
as a whole? As a result, local people are unlikely to
be available to aVord to live there in future.
David Higgins:One of the big things for the games is
that 16,000 homes should come from the Stratford
development and the Olympic park site, well in
advance of the time that they would have been built
if the Olympics had not been there. There has been
relocation of businesses, and the vast majority of
those businesses and jobs have been saved. The key
thing is to increase supply—and not only of homes.
The area has a big issue of lack of employment and
hopefully the new infrastructure, particularly the
railway, will mean that jobs will come to the area.
Q210 Mr Davidson: Am I right in thinking that
house price inflation in the area has been higher than
in London as a whole and in the rest of the country?
David Higgins: I do not know all the final statistics.
Q211 MrDavidson:Doyou accept the general point
that if we are talking about regeneration of that area,
it is important to identify whether the benefits go to
people who are local now and who were local when
the process began, rather than to people who move
in from the outside?
David Higgins: You are absolutely right. Of all
housing built on publicly owned land, 50% will be
aVordable housing.
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Q212 Mr Davidson: Every house is aVordable to
somebody. What do you mean by aVordable
housing? Will there be monitoring to identify
whether it is occupied by people who were
previously living in the area?
David Higgins: Yes, there will be. The aVordable
housing will be classified under Housing
Corporation rules as either shared ownership or
social rented housing. Those people that have been
relocated from the site are being relocated to other
aVordable housing in the area. The housing
associations that assisted them will get priority for
the new homes that we have built.
Q213 Mr Davidson: Is the aVordable housing
aVordable for renting or for purchase?
DavidHiggins: It is for renting and for shared equity.
Of the 50% of housing I mentioned, 70% will be
for renting
Q214 Mr Davidson: Only 30% is for purchase then.
You can see my point about the impact on people
who already live in the area. Am I right in thinking
that that is not being monitored at the moment?
David Higgins: All the housing starts in the area are
being closely monitored. The issue about the valley
is that very substantial amounts of new housing are
being built. Tower Hamlets, for instance, will have
nearly 100,000 additional people in the next 15
years. The challenge for Tower Hamlets and
Newham is to find public space, parks and sporting
facilities. This scheme delivers those.
Q215 Mr Davidson: You are aware of the issue of
displacement. I shall pick up the question of buying
land. To what extent have land prices been higher
than expected when you have been purchasing?
David Higgins: The largest part of land on the site
acquired is in the ownership of the ODA. That was
transferred from the Department for Transport for
a nominal amount of money, which has allowed the
public sector to ensure that it will benefit from any
profit share in the deals with the developers of the
village and the shopping centre that were recently
announced.
Q216 Mr Davidson: I would much prefer you to
answer the questions that I was asking you. Some of
the information that you have given is helpful, but it
does not deal with the point.
David Higgins: The compulsory purchase order
process sets a date for the designation of the CPO,
which was in November 2005. That was when the
price of the land was set.
Q217 Mr Davidson: Are you satisfied that there has
been no profiteering by people who have sold land
to you?
DavidHiggins: If land changes froman area thatwas
deeply depressed with little opportunity for growth
and it becomes the centre of one of the largest
redevelopments in London for a long time,
economic activity will flow and land values will
increase. The way that the Government can capture
that is by owning the land—and theywill own a large
part of it. Otherwise, they can capture it through
some other planning gain mechanism.
Q218 Mr Davidson: Does your assessment of the
wider impact take account of the impact upon the
construction industry? Clearly, there are substantial
labour shortages in construction and this project
is going to have an enormous impact upon
construction inflation. Is that being calculated as
part of the whole exercise of assessing the impact?
DavidHiggins:Absolutely. The £900million that the
Secretary of State announced in September included
a 1% additional estimate for inflation on the site.
Q219 Mr Davidson: Not just on the site, but the
impact that that is likely to have upon the rest of
the country.
David Higgins: The Olympics account for 2% of all
construction activity during a five-year period. That
is not substantial across the country. The benefit of
this site is that the railway linkages mean that much
of the services and material can be sourced from a
wide part of the country. In London itself, around
12% of activity will be Olympic-related during the
games; however, Terminal 5 will be finished at that
time.
Q220 Mr Davidson: There are already substantial
labour shortages in construction, and labour is being
sucked in from quite a wide area, not only from
across the whole of the UK, but the whole of
Europe, and that has an impact upon public services.
Will that be itemised in the assessment of the impact
of the Olympics?
David Higgins: Our whole procurement strategy,
which we are launching in two days, takes into
account how we diversify our supply chain.
Q221 Mr Davidson: I understand that. However,
what I was asking was whether or not that will be
assessed as part of the adverse side of the wider
benefits.
David Higgins: Absolutely.
Q222 Mr Davidson: Can I ask whether there are
plans for local people in terms of training and
construction?
DavidHiggins:Yes, there is an academy inWaltham
Forest, which is already planningwhat it will dowith
the significant money put aside by the LDA, and
which comes from planning gain.
Q223 Mr Davidson: Will you give some further
clarification on that? I particularly want to ask
whether labour on the site will be directly employed
or will operate on the lump, in bogus self-
employment.
David Higgins: I met with the TUC last week, and
the ODA’s objective is certainly to support direct
employment strongly, because it gives greater
control, particularly over health and safety.
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Q224 Mr Davidson: I am not quite sure what that
answer means. Was that a yes?Will all the labour on
the site be directly employed?
DavidHiggins:Over the past 20 years, the amount of
directly employed labour in the construction
industry has declined significantly. If we dictated the
situation, such that only directly employed labour
could be used on the site, the impact of the Treasury
and of the Government coVers could be to scare
contractors oV and to reduce the market. We can
achieve the same objective by working with the
industry and with the union movement to maximise
direct labour on the site, and that is exactly what we
shall do.
Q225 Mr Davidson: My final question is on cost
capping. Is the GLA council tax contribution of
£625 million a capped amount?
Jonathan Stephens: The memorandum of
understanding that sets out the original public sector
funding package does not put a cap on any
contribution, whether from theGLA, or council tax,
Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Questions 23–24 (Helen Goodman): Tax exemptions in the Finance Act 2006
The Finance Act 2006:
— Exempts the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games Ltd (LOCOG) from
Corporation Tax.
— Exempts the International Olympic Committee (IOC) from Corporation Tax.
— Exempts foreign resident athletes from paying income tax on any income arising from their
performance at the Olympic Games.
— Provides for certain persons who temporarily enter the UK to carry out Olympic-related business
to be exempt from tax on the revenues they earn from the work which they perform in relation to
the Games.
— Provides for withholding tax not to be levied in relation to the sums of money paid to LOCOG or
to the IOC by third parties who have acquired television rights or marketing rights relating to the
Games and for withholding tax not to be levied on payments from LOCOG to the IOC.
These exemptions are in accordance with the undertakings given to the IOC.
There is no exemption from VAT. As a trading body the LOCOG is able to recover its VAT in the same
way as any other business.
Question 174 (Mr Richard Bacon):Recommendations made by the Olympic Projects Review Group (OPRG)
The OPRG was formed by DCMS in April 2006 under the terms of the Olympic Delivery Authority’s
Financial Memorandum. Its role is to facilitate eYcient scrutiny of business cases for projects above
the ODA’s £20 million delegation, to assess their value for money and aVordability and to make
recommendations to the Secretary of State, the Mayor and HM Treasury for their approval.
Under the Financial Memorandum the OPRG is required to submit its recommendations for approval
within two to three weeks of receipt of a business case.
Speed of decision making is facilitated by its representation which includes the Mayor’s oYce and
HM Treasury as well as the Olympic Lottery Distributor and other key stakeholders (CLG, LOCOG
and OGC).
Since its formation OPRG has recommended for approval the following significant projects:
— Appointment of the CLM consortium as the ODA’s Delivery Partner.
— Olympic Park Enabling Works—including site investigations, demolition of buildings,
remediation and remodelling of the land of the Olympic Park.
or the lottery. The only people who can levy
additional council tax are the Mayor and the GLA,
and the Mayor has made his position clear.
Q226 Mr Davidson: So that is a no—the amount is
not capped. The lottery contribution of £410 million
is not capped either.
Jonathan Stephens: That is correct.
Q227 Chairman: That concludes our hearing. I
wanted to ask you another question about the
legacy, but you can answer it in a note. I want to
know who will own the main Olympic stadium after
2012, who will pay for the conversion, and what the
ongoing running costs will be.
I thank you for your patience with us this afternoon,
gentlemen—particularly Mr Stephens. Thank you
too, Mr Stephens, for your reassurance that you will
deliver the games on time and on budget—will you
not?
Jonathan Stephens: I am looking forward to it.7
7 Ev 24
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— Upgrade works to Stratford Regional Station to increase its capacity in advance of the Games.
— Contribution to Works to the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) to link it to the new Stratford
International Station and to extend the network south of the Thames.
— Contribution to water control works at Prescott Lock which will enable the transportation by
water of construction freight to and from the Olympic Park.
Question 195 (Mr Richard Bacon): The £400 million
The ODA has engaged the Delivery Partner CLM to provide world class programme and project
management and expertise. They will manage the programme risks, provide high level reporting and initiate
mitigation measures to ensure that the programme is delivered to time and to budget. The ODA remains
the client and retains the responsibility for the delivery of the Olympic infrastructure and venues together
with the accountability, through Ministers, to Parliament.
The total of the Programme Delivery budget, including the revised cost amendment of circa £400 million
referred to by the Secretary of State on 21 November 2006 is £570 million. This represents around 10% of
the total costs of theODAProgramme, which is consistentwith the industry norms for a project of this scale,
complexity and concentration. Of this, the combined staYng, accommodation and IT cost of ODA and
Delivery Partner CLM is £476 million. The balance of £94 million is to cover the establishment on the
Olympic Park site of the necessary provision for up to 9,000 construction workers, including health and
canteen facilities and transportation. At the time of the bid, no decisions had been taken on the delivery
structures necessary, and the IOC requirements did not include estimates of programme delivery costs.
Question 227 (Mr Edward Leigh): Ownership of the Main Olympic Stadium after 2012, who will pay for the
conversion and what the ongoing running costs will be
Funding for post-Games conversion was included in the original Public Sector Funding Package. No
decision has yet been taken on who will own the stadium after 2012. However, the Olympic Board is
committed to delivering on its commitment to the communities of London and the IOC to have a sustainable
athletics and community sports-for-all concept in legacy. The Olympic Board has discussed a report on
legacy that shows that the “Living Stadium” concept—with a mixed sport oVering, combined with
commercial, school and community use—is the most compelling option to deliver the legacy ambition. The
Olympic Board has commissioned further work on this concept. The running cost consequences will follow
from the nature of the legacy facilities adopted. Running cost figures are not available at this stage.
Memorandum submitted by the British Property Federation
PLANNING GAIN SUPPLEMENT AND THE OLYMPICS TAX BILL
Introduction
The Treasury’s proposed new development land tax would add tens of millions of pounds to the 2012
London Olympics tax bill.
Planning applications received after 2009 for the Olympic legacy developments will be subjected to a
massive extra land tax which has not been included in current cost estimates.
Although the main Olympic stadium application has already been submitted, planning applications for
developments after 2009 that will make up the legacy will be hit with a new development tax that will be set
higher than the VAT bill at 17.5% which the Treasury has previously refused to waive.
The Planning Gain Supplement (PGS) will exceed VAT payments
The new development land tax, called the Planning Gain Supplement (PGS), is a tax on the uplift in land
value that occurs as a result of planning permission being granted, with the rate expected to be set between
20% and 30%—almost certainly exceeding VAT payments.
Much of the land designated for Olympic development is brownfield and will realise a massive increase
in value through both the Olympic and subsequent legacy developments. Chancellor Gordon Brown
declared that just 70% of the monies raised through PGS would be returned to the “local authority area”,
leading many to believe that this is yet another attempt to fill Treasury coVers by taxing regeneration.
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How PGS will be calculated
The PGS works as follows: if a plot of land was worth £100k and then rose in value to £2 million once
planning permission for a new development was agreed, the PGS at a rate of 20% to 30% of £1.9 million
would yield around £380k to £570k.
The development community is willing to pay for infrastructure, but PGS is flawed
The development community’s opposition to PGS is not based on a reluctance to pay its share of
community infrastructure, but rather we find that the PGSmechanismwill not work in practice and is likely
to jeopardise vital regeneration schemes and housing delivery in the UK.
Since the tax will be centrally collected and redistribute back to local and regional areas it will remove
the vital link between developers and local communities who have no certainty that development-critical
infrastructure, currently provided directly by developers, will be delivered on time and will be enough to pay
for the required infrastructure.
Through the present “Section 106 system” developers pay for and deliver community infrastructure to
mitigate the impact of new development. In many cases developers will provide schools, leisure centres,
roads and aVordable housing—all of which would not be provided under the PGS. The BPF calculates that
“Section 106 agreements”, negotiated between local authorities and developers, raise over £3 billion per year
in benefits for communities.1
PGS is opposed by industry
PGS has been opposed by business and industry alongside staunch criticism from the Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats. Independent research2 published last September showed PGS would raise less revenue
than current land tax arrangements, and could potentially hamper the supply of aVordable housing and
other local benefits currently provided through the Section 106 system.
Government consultation on PGS
The Government consultation on PGS ended on 28 February and the new tax is scheduled to be
introduced in 2009.
The BPF’s response to the Treasury’s consultation is available at:
http://www.bpf.org.uk/topics/document/23080/bpf-response-to-governments-planning-gain-supplement-consultation
About the British Property Federation
The British Property Federation is the voice of property in the UK, representing companies owning,
managing and investing in property. This includes a broad range of businesses comprising commercial
property owners, financial institutions including pension funds, corporate landlords, local private landlords,
as well as all those professions that support the industry, such as law firms, surveyors and consultants.
Every day BPF members are making key contributions to the economic and social well-being of the UK.
Our commercial members provide the workspace for business and fund the regeneration of our towns and
cities. Our residential members focus on the private rented sector, providing housing choice to meet the
needs of a mobile workforce, a prerequisite for achieving higher growth in our economy. And our investor
members rely on the performance of £250 billion worth of investment in property to fund pensions.
1 The BPF report,PropertyDevelopment in theCommunity,May 2006 drew on an independent survey of 126major developments
carried out by BPF members during 2003–04. It found that over £3 billion had been invested into community projects agreed
with local authorities in Section 106 agreements associated with the developments.
2Knight Frank independent research published on 19 September 2006 can be viewed at: http://www.bpf.org.uk/newsroom/
pressreleases/document/21101/independent-pgs-study-commissioned
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